



# Security Council

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## Letter dated 25 November 2024 from the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015), whose mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2731 (2024) have the honour to transmit herewith the interim report, submitted in accordance with paragraph 18 of resolution 2731 (2024).

The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) on 1 November 2024 and was considered by the Committee on 14 November 2024.

The Panel would appreciate if the present letter and the interim report were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Michael **Gibb**

Coordinator  
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## Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2731 (2024)

### *Summary*

South Sudan is one of the most food insecure countries in the world. Nearly three quarters of the population requires food assistance, while famine looms in several parts of the country. The conflict in the Sudan has forced more than 830,000 people to seek shelter in South Sudan and reduced the Government's oil revenues by almost 70 per cent.

South Sudan leaders have struggled to manage and respond to these compounding crises, with the political process in Juba largely consumed by competition for power, positions and control of dwindling public resources. Unprecedented flooding has now submerged as much as 7 to 12 per cent of the country's landmass, further impeding the humanitarian response.

On 13 September 2024, South Sudan leaders agreed to extend by a further two years the transitional period established by the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (peace agreement). Their consensual decision reflects continued space for political dialogue in Juba, but also an admission that too little of the peace agreement has been implemented to facilitate free and fair elections, and to set the stage for the next phase of the country's development. In broader terms, it also reflects the fact that few of the security and political elites at the heart of the peace process have much to gain from bringing it to an end.

As the prospects for democratic elections recede for another two years, the power to appoint almost every position in the Government and security sector, as well as to allocate public resources, remains firmly in the hands of elites in Juba. The President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) party and the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF), in particular, have effectively used this control to weaken their opponents by encouraging defections and continually reshuffling almost every institution of the State. For those outside of this system, there are fewer and fewer alternatives to joining it.

In Central Equatoria State, for example, the government has effectively fragmented the National Salvation Front by courting several high-profile defections. The result, however, has been an intensified conflict with the remaining elements of the group, as well as increased predation on the civilian population as multiple groups now seek to sustain their own independent operations.

Regional engagement remains critical to the South Sudanese peace process, and the Kenya-led Tumaini Initiative has offered some hope of brokering peace with a number of remaining opposition groups. Existing signatories to the 2018 peace agreement have, however, objected to the creation of any additional agreements or institutions for fear these will only complicate the already fraught implementation process.

The country's borders have also been tested by regional instability, necessitating several high-level political interventions. A significant number of armed soldiers from the Uganda People's Defence Forces have been identified in at least three South Sudanese states, in violation of the arms embargo, while members of the Sudan Rapid Support Forces have also crossed the South Sudan northern border.

For the majority of the population struggling to survive an acute humanitarian emergency, it remains unclear whether South Sudan leaders can use the next two years to achieve what they did not during the previous six.

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\* Circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

## I. Background

### A. Mandate and travel

1. By its resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council imposed a sanctions regime targeting individuals and entities contributing to the conflict in South Sudan and established a sanctions committee (the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan). The Committee designated six individuals for targeted sanctions on 1 July 2015. With the adoption of its resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), the Council imposed an arms embargo on the territory of South Sudan and added two individuals to the list of designated individuals. On 30 May 2024, with the adoption of its resolution [2731 \(2024\)](#), the Council renewed the sanctions regime until 31 May 2025.
2. By its resolution [2731 \(2024\)](#), the Security Council also extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan until 1 July 2025 so that it might provide information and analysis in support of the work of the Committee, including as relevant to the potential designation of individuals and entities that might be engaging in the activities described in paragraph 7 of resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#).
3. On 10 September 2024, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, appointed the five members of the Panel (see [S/2024/676](#)).
4. Due to delays in the appointment of the Panel, the Panel was unable to travel to South Sudan prior to drafting the present report in October 2024.

### B. Cooperation with international organizations and other stakeholders

5. While the Panel operates independently of United Nations agencies and institutions, it wishes to express its gratitude to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and other United Nations staff, including in New York.
6. Prior to drafting the present report, the Panel requested meetings with the Government of South Sudan and several regional Member States. At the time of writing, the Panel had not received any responses to these requests. Drawing on its extensive networks in both South Sudan and the region, however, the Panel had been able to speak to several present and former members of the Government of South Sudan, senior figures within the South Sudan People's Defence Forces (SSPDF) and other branches of the security sector, senior representatives of South Sudanese opposition groups, members of the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly, South Sudanese journalists and civil society organizations, as well as companies active in South Sudan, civilians and representatives of foreign armed groups present in South Sudan.
7. In paragraph 17 of its resolution [2731 \(2024\)](#), the Security Council emphasized the importance of the Panel consulting with concerned Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations and UNMISS. The Panel was able to consult extensively with United Nations bodies and agencies in South Sudan and elsewhere. It also consulted with most security mechanisms established by the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (peace agreement), as well as with several multilateral institutions active in South Sudan.
8. The Panel sent 10 official letters to the Government of South Sudan, regional Member States and other individuals and entities, to which it received one substantive response prior to drafting the present report. The responses the Panel received subsequently are included in the annexes to the present report.

## C. Methodology

9. The present report was prepared, in October 2024, on the basis of the Panel's own independent research and investigations. The Panel conducted numerous interviews to gather a body of credible information, obtained from a wide range of sources. The Panel reviewed documentation made available by individuals, commercial entities, confidential sources and the Government of South Sudan. The Panel has made a conscious effort to ensure its reporting is informed by a range of perspectives on the South Sudanese peace process, including multiple groupings present within the Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity and remaining opposition groups. The Panel also drew on its earlier work, including previous reports to the Security Council and the Committee, both public and confidential.

10. The Panel followed the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of December 2006 (S/2006/997). The Panel has corroborated the information contained in the present report using multiple independent sources to meet the appropriate evidentiary standards.

11. The Panel conducted its research with the greatest transparency possible, while giving priority to confidentiality where necessary. A source or document is described as confidential only when its disclosure could compromise the safety of the source.

## II. Complex humanitarian challenges

12. South Sudan continues to face an acute humanitarian emergency. Years of compounding political, economic and security challenges have combined with significant external shocks to produce complex and deeply entrenched crises.

### A. Unprecedented flooding

13. South Sudan leaders are poised to declare a national emergency as widespread floods have submerged as much as 7 to 12 per cent of the country's landmass and nearly 30 per cent of states such as Unity and Warrap.<sup>1</sup> Around 3.3 million people, spread across more than half of the country's counties, are expected to be affected by floods in 2024.<sup>2</sup> Tens of thousands of acres of farmland have been submerged or damaged by flood water, along with hundreds of schools and waterpoints and dozens of health facilities.<sup>3</sup> One Juba resident who had recently returned from visiting his ancestral home in Jonglei State, described "an ocean" where there had previously been thick forest.<sup>4</sup>

14. The flooding has compounded the impact of other humanitarian challenges. South Sudan has now received more than 830,000 individuals fleeing the conflict in the Sudan, adding to the 2.2 million people that were already displaced within its

<sup>1</sup> Interview with a geospatial expert, October 2024. See also the United Nations Satellite Centre, imagery of South Sudan flooding 5 to 9 October 2024, available at [https://unosat.org/static/unosat\\_filesystem/4002/UNOSAT\\_A3\\_Natural\\_Landscape\\_FL20220424SSD\\_05Oct\\_09Oct2024\\_SouthSudan\\_Week24.pdf](https://unosat.org/static/unosat_filesystem/4002/UNOSAT_A3_Natural_Landscape_FL20220424SSD_05Oct_09Oct2024_SouthSudan_Week24.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> The South Sudan Flood Preparedness and Response Plan, June to December 2024, prepared by humanitarian organizations in consultation with the Government of South Sudan, available at <https://fsccluster.org/sites/default/files/South%20Sudan%20Floods%20Preparedness%20and%20Response%2022%20June%202024.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> See annex 2.

<sup>4</sup> Interview with a South Sudanese civilian, October 2024.

borders.<sup>5</sup> Many have arrived in the states that have also been most affected by flooding. More than 8 million people, around 70 per cent of the population, are now in need of food assistance<sup>6</sup> as the price of food and non-food items have surged.<sup>7</sup> “Emergency” (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification 4) levels of food insecurity remain widespread across much of the country.<sup>8</sup>

15. In addition, as of October 2024, approximately 75 per cent of the roads in South Sudan have been cut off or otherwise affected by flooding or other impediments.<sup>9</sup> This has significantly complicated the humanitarian response, forcing humanitarian actors to rely on cash transfers,<sup>10</sup> expensive aerial deliveries and lower-impact sensitization and messaging campaigns.<sup>11</sup> It has also focused service provision on areas where humanitarians already have pre-existing assets. Some local experts have warned that this has created “island”<sup>12</sup> preserves that can reinforce existing inequities while leaving other communities marginalized.<sup>13</sup>

16. As flooding has displaced both people and cattle, it has also become intertwined with significant intercommunal tensions and subnational violence, including in the states of Warrap, Jonglei, Central Equatoria, and Upper Nile.<sup>14</sup> Experts have warned that these challenges may not be temporary, as it may now not be possible to return to previous patterns of life in some areas where planting and harvest cycles have been permanently disrupted.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>5</sup> International Organization for Migration and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, data on population movements from Sudan to South Sudan, last accessed 22 October 2024, available at <https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiTmMwNTljNWYtYmVhYi00ZGI2LTgwYzAtN2UyNDZmZTRlbnBkIiwidCI6IjE1ODgyNjJkLTlzMltNDNiNC1iZDZILWJjZTQ5YzhlnE4NiIsImMiOjh9&pageName=ReportSection95859b8850a76994e6fb&pageName=ReportSection4f5adec6c9d67015bc74>.

<sup>6</sup> Famine Early Warning System Network, Food Assistance Outlook Brief, August 2024, available at <https://fews.net/sites/default/files/2024-08/FEWSNET-FAOB-August%202024.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> Reach, Joint Market Monitoring Initiative, September 2024, available at [https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/repository/586c51ea/REACH\\_SSD\\_Factsheet\\_JMMI\\_September-2024.pdf](https://repository.impact-initiatives.org/document/repository/586c51ea/REACH_SSD_Factsheet_JMMI_September-2024.pdf).

<sup>8</sup> Famine Early Warning System Network, “Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes remain widespread as flooding expands”, September 2024, available at <https://fews.net/east-africa/south-sudan/key-message-update/september-2024>.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, South Sudan Logistics Cluster map of access constraints, available at [www.logcluster.org/en/document/south-sudan-access-constraints-map-18-october-2024](http://www.logcluster.org/en/document/south-sudan-access-constraints-map-18-october-2024).

<sup>10</sup> Such programmes provide individuals or communities with cash, rather than with food or other goods and services.

<sup>11</sup> Interviews with seven humanitarian actors and local analysts, October 2024.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with a local infrastructure expert, October 2024. See also annex 3.

<sup>13</sup> Interviews with a local infrastructure expert and a government official in Unity State, October 2024.

<sup>14</sup> Recent reporting also indicates that there is a risk of “significant exposure” to gender-based violence in 80 per cent of South Sudan counties, with reports of sexual violence increasing by 168 per cent in the second quarter of 2024 compared with the same period in 2023. See UNHCR Protection Cluster, “South Sudan: Protection Monitoring Spotlight, July to August 2024”, 25 September 2024, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-protection-monitoring-spotlight-july-august-2024>; UNMISS, “Brief on violence affecting civilians, April to June 2024”, available at [https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly\\_brief\\_on\\_violence\\_affecting\\_civilians\\_april\\_-\\_june\\_2024\\_0.pdf](https://unmiss.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/quarterly_brief_on_violence_affecting_civilians_april_-_june_2024_0.pdf); and Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “South Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot, September 2024”, available at [www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2024](http://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2024).

<sup>15</sup> Interviews with humanitarian actors, climatologists and community representatives, October 2024.

## B. Limited planning and flood defences have exacerbated impacts

17. The most recent floods were an increasingly predictable consequence of climate change in the region. The South Sudanese Nile River Basin and Sudd Wetlands are connected to three converging hydrological systems: the Nile's western tributaries; outflows from Lake Victoria; and runoffs from the Ethiopian highlands. In 2024, increased year-on-year rainfall in East Africa, coupled with the existing saturation of South Sudan floodplains, have resulted in flooding with little historical precedence.<sup>16</sup>

18. According to a range of experts, however, the extent and impact of flooding in South Sudan can also be traced to the cumulative impact of limited government preparations and the failure of much of its flood mitigation and prevention infrastructure over many years.<sup>17</sup> Several experts were, for example, concerned that limited dyke systems have offered "false hope" to some communities that have remained in flood-prone parts of Jonglei State and Unity State.<sup>18</sup> In several such locations, hand-built levees were quickly overwhelmed by water, leading to significant displacement.<sup>19</sup>

19. Similarly, government officials have pressed ahead with a highly politicized dredging project as a piecemeal attempt to open up the Nile's tributaries in Unity State, despite criticisms from ecologists and technical experts.<sup>20</sup> Several local experts told the Panel that they believed this project had limited or "no impact" to date.<sup>21</sup> Other experts told the Panel that several of the countrywide road and bridge construction projects have blocked or disrupted the passage of water, and that powerful road construction contractors have ignored feasibility studies for road design and flood resilience, leading to both destruction and displacement.<sup>22</sup>

20. The diversion and misappropriation of the country's limited public resources have also undermined its ability to mitigate and respond to flooding. In September 2022, for example, the Government allocated a total of around \$26.7 million to a national flood response programme,<sup>23</sup> contracting 25 South Sudanese companies<sup>24</sup> to provide supplies, including sorghum and mosquito nets, worth around \$20 million.<sup>25</sup> Few of these resources ultimately reached the victims of flooding, however, and

<sup>16</sup> Reports on meteorological trends in South Sudan, on file with the Panel.

<sup>17</sup> Interviews with 19 climatologists, government officials, humanitarian agencies and local community representatives, October 2024.

<sup>18</sup> Interviews with humanitarians, local analysts and an infrastructure expert, October 2024.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., corroborated by reports from local observers, September to October 2024, and photographs reviewed by the Panel.

<sup>20</sup> Interviews with an infrastructure expert and an international response coordinator, October 2024. See also annexes 4 and 5.

<sup>21</sup> Interviews with a local ecologist and three local analysts in Unity State, October 2024.

<sup>22</sup> Interview with an infrastructure expert involved in drafting road feasibility studies, October 2024. Corroborated by social media posts, photographs and videos recorded by community representatives in Western Bahr el Ghazal State, Northern Bahr el Ghazal State, and Lakes State. See also, for example, Eye Radio, "ARC commits to resolving Wau road blockage after heavy rainfall", 24 May 2024, available at [www.eyeradio.org/arc-commits-to-resolving-wau-road-blockage-after-heavy-rainfall/](http://www.eyeradio.org/arc-commits-to-resolving-wau-road-blockage-after-heavy-rainfall/). See also S/2024/343.

<sup>23</sup> Eye Radio, "Govt allocates \$16.7m to flood-affected populations", 10 September 2022, available at [www.eyeradio.org/govt-allocates-16-7m-to-flood-affected-populations/](http://www.eyeradio.org/govt-allocates-16-7m-to-flood-affected-populations/); and statement by the Office of the President, 30 November 2022.

<sup>24</sup> Eye Radio, "Govt allocates \$16.7m".

<sup>25</sup> Number One Citizen, "Government procures food for vulnerable flood victims", 2 November 2022. See also [www.eyeradio.org/govt-procures-food-non-food-aid-worth-20m-for-floods-survivors/](http://www.eyeradio.org/govt-procures-food-non-food-aid-worth-20m-for-floods-survivors/).



several tonnes of food aid were allegedly stolen.<sup>26</sup> Many of the contracted companies had little or no experience of managing emergency response logistics, and several suppliers were never paid by the Government.<sup>27</sup>

21. In July 2024, the Government approved a \$76 million emergency flood response plan.<sup>28</sup> As of October 2024, however, these funds had not been released as public finances remain constrained by serious disruption to the country's oil exports.<sup>29</sup>

22. As government revenues have plummeted and significant cuts have been made to humanitarian funding, the Government has also increasingly sought to tax humanitarian supplies.<sup>30</sup> Impediments to humanitarian access, including attacks on humanitarian personnel and assets, movement restrictions and other bureaucratic impediments, were reportedly 15 per cent higher in 2024 compared with 2023.<sup>31</sup> Cash transfers, valued at more than \$76 million in 2024, also routinely lost as much as half their value as the official exchange rate that humanitarian agencies are required to use has diverged dramatically from the parallel unofficial rate with which most people and companies transact.<sup>32</sup>

### III. Fragmented political and security landscape

23. On 13 September 2024, South Sudan leaders agreed to extend the transitional period established by the 2018 peace agreement by two years, further postponing the country's first elections until December 2026. The decision followed an assessment made by the high-level standing committee that monitors the implementation of the peace agreement, in which the committee found that only 17 per cent of its provisions had been implemented, while 57 per cent of the agreement remained "outstanding."<sup>33</sup> The postponement of elections had become increasingly likely as the polling date approached with only the most rudimentary preparations for elections in place. The President's National Security Adviser stressed that the extension would allow the Government "to complete the census, register political parties and strengthen constitutional processes."<sup>34</sup>

24. As the country's period of transitional governance has been extended, its political and security landscape has become increasingly fragmented. The highly centralized power structures of the transitional period have given the principal signatories to the peace agreement, in particular the President of South Sudan, Salva Kiir Mayardit,

<sup>26</sup> Reports by international monitors, February 2023. See also Sudans Post, "Ex-humanitarian minister Peter Mayen denies walking away with flood victims' emergency funds", 27 November 2022.

<sup>27</sup> Interview with an individual contracted by the government, October 2022.

<sup>28</sup> Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Briefing to the Security Council on South Sudan, 14 August 2024.

<sup>29</sup> Interviews with an international response coordinator and a senior government official involved in flood response, October 2024.

<sup>30</sup> *Wall Street Journal*, "South Sudan's Economic Crisis Is So Bad It's Taxing Its Only Lifeline", 8 October 2024.

<sup>31</sup> Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "South Sudan: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (September 2024)", 11 October 2024, available at [www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2024](https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-september-2024).

<sup>32</sup> Interviews with three cash transfer programme specialists, September to October 2024. See also the Cash Working Group, "Cash and Voucher Dashboard, January to August 2024", available at <https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoibm9kaWZlMzkyZWItMDFjZi00OTgyLTgzYWYtMjEyNDhjNTdmMTE3liwidCI6IjBmOWUzNWRLTU0NGYtNGY2MC1iZGNjLTViYTRxNmU2ZGM3MCI6ImMiOj9>.

<sup>33</sup> Report by the High-level Standing Committee, dated 10 September 2024, on file with the Panel.

<sup>34</sup> The East African, "South Sudan delays polls to 2026, extends transitional government", 14 September 2024.

control over almost all the country's political and security positions, including within Parliament and subnational institutions. As the transitional period has dragged on, many opponents have either grown weaker or felt compelled to break away in an attempt to join the dominant parties within the system. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) party of the President and SSPDF has found this to be fertile ground for weakening its political and military rivals by courting defections, while also reshuffling senior positions in the security sector.<sup>35</sup>

## **A. Fragmentation of the National Salvation Front has destabilized Central Equatoria**

25. In the Equatorias, the Government has continued its successful efforts to encourage senior National Salvation Front (NAS) commanders and their fighters to defect from Thomas Cirillo, the leader of NAS. This has fragmented and weakened NAS, while also allowing the Government to use newly allied defectors as proxy forces in pursuit of remaining NAS elements. This mirrors the strategies that the Government has effectively utilized in other parts of the country, including in the Upper Nile and Unity States.<sup>36</sup> As in those other instances, however, this campaign has also led to a significant deterioration in the local security situation.

26. As NAS has faced increasing logistical and resource challenges, it has become easier for the Government to encourage its commanders to defect.<sup>37</sup> Several have been enticed by the promise of a paid position within the Police or SSPDF, and some NAS defectors have already been integrated into SSPDF units in Mundri East and Morobo counties.<sup>38</sup>

27. It is also alleged that a substantial portion of funds allocated for the implementation of the peace agreement, but diverted to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, has been used to encourage NAS defections.<sup>39</sup> After being summoned by the Parliament, for example, the Minister for Cabinet Affairs, Martin Elia Lomuro, confirmed that an irregular withdrawal of \$1,050,000 had been made to facilitate "peace implementation" with NAS commanders in April 2024.<sup>40</sup>

28. The two most prominent recent defections have been those of Kennedy Kenyi "Warrior" Abdu Lopiong, who now operates as an SSPDF-allied proxy force, and John Latio Kenyi Loburong, who now leads his own group, the National Salvation United Forces (NASU).<sup>41</sup> Documents reviewed by the Panel indicate that both defections had been negotiated by the highest levels of Government, including by the Presidency and Ministry of Cabinet Affairs.<sup>42</sup>

29. The Government has increasingly sought to use some of the defectors as proxy forces against remaining NAS elements. In other instances, they have targeted each other. Forces under the command of Kenyi "Warrior", for example, reportedly operate

<sup>35</sup> See annexes 6 and 7.

<sup>36</sup> Other notable examples of this strategy can be found in [S/2024/343](#), [S/2023/294](#), [S/2022/884](#) and [S/2022/359](#).

<sup>37</sup> See annex 8. Interviews with Thomas Cirillo, September and October 2024.

<sup>38</sup> Interviews with local civilians and confidential sources, September and October 2024.

<sup>39</sup> See annexes 9 to 12. Interviews with four civil society representatives and local analysts, October 2024. See also, Eye Radio, "Dr. Lomuro admits to diverting peace funds to special projects", 7 June 2024; and Sudans Post, "Lomuro claims he was quoted 'out of context' on \$10 million peace funds", 10 June 2024.

<sup>40</sup> See annexes 9 to 12. See also Eye Radio, "Dr. Lomuro admits diverting peace fund".

<sup>41</sup> See annexes 13 to 16.

<sup>42</sup> Interviews with five civil society representatives, October 2024. See also annexes 13 to 16.

outside of formal SSPDF structures, but have been tasked with targeting NASU and NAS elements around Lainya, in Central Equatoria State.<sup>43</sup>

30. In one incident, on 9 October 2024, at least 24 people, including 19 civilians, were killed and several injured in Wonduruba in Central Equatoria State as a result of clashes between SSPDF, allied with forces commanded by Kenyi “Warrior”, and NASU forces under the command of Loburong.<sup>44</sup> Those clashes brought condemnations from local communities, civil society groups and the State Government.<sup>45</sup>

31. There has also been a significant increase in abductions and extortions in parts of Central Equatoria State, including in Juba, Morobo and Yei counties.<sup>46</sup> Many splinter groups, low on resources, have targeted civilians and humanitarians, leading to the suspension of some humanitarian operations in the area.

32. The Panel spoke with seven individuals who had been abducted for up to four days, claiming NAS elements had demanded thousands of dollars from their employers to secure their release.<sup>47</sup> The same individuals also alleged that local SSPDF units arbitrarily arrested and detained civilians suspected of being sympathetic to NAS, demanding as much as SSP 200,000 (\$65) for their release.<sup>48</sup>

33. Despite losing several commanders, NAS under Thomas Cirillo has survived and replenished its ranks through abductions and recruitment,<sup>49</sup> while several other local armed groups have attached themselves to the NAS brand.<sup>50</sup>

34. In response, the Government has further intensified its military operations in the area by deploying additional defectors and forces.<sup>51</sup> Several civilian local county commissioners have also been replaced with new officials with military backgrounds,<sup>52</sup> and, as an additional measure, SSPDF military operations across southern Central Equatoria State have been consolidated under the command of the recently promoted SSPDF commander in Yei.<sup>53</sup> At the same time, the Panel has been told that the paid integration of defected NAS officers into SSPDF units who have gone months without

<sup>43</sup> Interviews with local community representatives, September and October 2024. See also annex 16.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. Corroborated by reports from field observers and monitors, on file with the Panel. See also annexes 18 and 21 to 23. See also UNMISS, “UNMISS alarmed by violent attacks in Juba County, calls for investigation and accountability”, 11 October 2024, available at <https://unmiss.unmissions.org/unmiss-alarmed-violent-attacks-juba-county-calls-investigation-and-accountability>.

<sup>45</sup> See annexes 17 to 20.

<sup>46</sup> Reports by monitors in Central Equatoria State, May and September 2024, on file with the Panel. Interviews with three civil society and humanitarian representatives, September to October 2024. See also UNMISS, “Brief on violence affecting civilians”.

<sup>47</sup> Interviews with seven abductees and a local community representative, October 2024.

<sup>48</sup> Interviews with family members of abducted civilians and community leaders, October 2024.

<sup>49</sup> See annexes 24 and 25. Interviews with Thomas Cirillo and a civil society representative, October 2024; and UNMISS, “UNMISS gravely concerned by rising abductions in Greater Yei, calls for collective action”, 2 August 2024. See also video published by NAS, available at [www.youtube.com/watch?v=s-mEqXbj-FA](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s-mEqXbj-FA); and Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, “Quarterly report on the status of implementation of the R-ARCSS from 1 July to 30 September 2024”, available at <https://jmecsouthsudan.org/index.php/reports/rjmec-quarterly-reports/254-rjmec-quarterly-report-on-the-status-of-implementation-of-the-r-arcss-from-1st-july-to-30th-september-2024/file>.

<sup>50</sup> Interviews with civil society representatives, October 2024. Corroborated by independent community reports, reviewed by the Panel, June to September 2024, and reports by international monitors, on file with the Panel.

<sup>51</sup> Reports by international observers, March 2024, on file with the Panel. Interviews with three civil society representatives and Thomas Cirillo, October 2024.

<sup>52</sup> Reports by local observers, August 2024, on file with the Panel. Interviews with a local analyst and a civil society representative, October 2024. See also The Dawn, “Governor Wani urge newly appointed county commissioners to improve security”, 7 August 2024.

<sup>53</sup> Interviews with a local analyst and a civil society representative, October 2024.

pay has heightened tensions and weakened command and control within parts of the army.<sup>54</sup>

## **B. Kenya-led Tumaini Initiative mediating with opposition groups**

35. The fragmentation of opposition groups has also complicated peacebuilding efforts, with the shifting political and security landscape now held together by a growing number of partially overlapping agreements and processes.

36. On 9 May 2024, high-level mediations were convened in Nairobi between the Government of South Sudan and some of the opposition groups that have not signed the 2018 peace agreement. Participants in the Tumaini Initiative – meaning “hope” – include the Real SPLM, led by Pagan Amum; the South Sudan United Front/Army, led by sanctioned individual Paul Malong Awan (SSi.008); and the South Sudan People’s Movement/Army, led by Stephen Buay. Sanctioned individual Simon Gatwech (SSi.002) of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) Kitgwang faction had also been invited, but was not able to travel from his location in the Sudan to participate in the talks.<sup>55</sup>

37. Mario Loku Thomas Jada, who had defected from NAS to form the NAS Revolutionary Command Council a few months prior to the talks, was also present. The remaining members of the South Sudan Opposition Movement Alliance had declined to participate, citing security concerns in Kenya and mistrust of the process. In August 2024, the Chief Mediator of the Tumaini Initiative, Lazaro Sumbeiywo, travelled to Rome in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade Thomas Cirillo to join the talks.<sup>56</sup>

38. On 15 July 2024, the parties to the Tumaini Initiative initialled a consensus document that outlined six “protocols”.<sup>57</sup> The day after, however, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) rejected the document and officially withdrew from the talks.<sup>58</sup>

39. In explaining their withdrawal, SPLM-IO officials stated that the Initiative had deviated from its intended purpose as a mediation forum. Plans for the Initiative to result in a standalone agreement, rather than being integrated into the existing 2018 peace agreement, amounted, they argued, to a “breach” of the peace agreement that “undermined” its implementation.<sup>59</sup>

40. Representatives of the SPLM-IO objected, for example, to the proposed creation of a National Leadership Council to function as an “internal guarantor” for the Tumaini Initiative eventual agreement.<sup>60</sup> Such a body, they argued, whose decisions would not be subject to approval by the existing South Sudan Cabinet or Legislature, would clearly infringe on the powers of the power-sharing institutions established by the 2018 peace agreement. They similarly objected that new Security Sector Reform

<sup>54</sup> Interviews with three civil society representatives, October 2024. Corroborated by reports by local observers, August 2024, on file with the Panel.

<sup>55</sup> Interviews with Simon Gatwech (SSi.002), May and June 2024.

<sup>56</sup> Interviews with Thomas Cirillo, Simon Gatwech (SSi.002), and members of the mediation team, October 2024.

<sup>57</sup> See annex 26.

<sup>58</sup> See annex 27.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Interviews with members of the government delegation team and other political figures in Juba, September and October 2024. See annex 27.

and Oversight Commissions would duplicate the functions of existing security mechanisms.<sup>61</sup>

41. These objections reflect longstanding SPLM-IO concerns with the supremacy of the 2018 peace agreement, which its leaders guard as the foundation for a role in the Government, a share of command positions within the country's security forces and the integration of its forces into a unified national army.<sup>62</sup>

42. Similar concerns were also shared by other prominent political figures in Juba. A report prepared by the high-level standing committee that monitors the implementation of the 2018 peace agreement, and which includes the Minister for Cabinet Affairs and the Secretary-General of SPLM, Peter Lam Booth, also found that several of the protocols conflicted with the peace agreement and instructed the government delegation to ensure that no new mechanisms or institutions were created.<sup>63</sup>

43. For the opposition parties participating in the Tumaini Initiative, however, the failure to implement the 2018 agreement, and especially its security reforms, proves the need for new and more robust implementation mechanisms.<sup>64</sup> A spokesperson for one of the opposition groups told the Panel that, without additional mechanisms, the Initiative would risk becoming yet another unimplemented agreement. Another told the Panel that "I would not sign the Tumaini Consensus if the oversight and implementation mechanisms are removed; I would return to the bush."<sup>65</sup> Paul Malong (Ssi.008) stressed that developing a new agreement only to integrate it with the failed 2018 agreement would only undermine the Tumaini Initiative.<sup>66</sup>

44. After a series of consultations, a compromise was proposed whereby the unimplemented aspects of the 2018 peace agreement were added to an implementation matrix for the Tumaini Initiative, which is currently being developed.<sup>67</sup>

## IV. Regional issues

### A. Regional response to the extension of the transitional period

45. Regional Member States and organizations remain critical to resolving the challenges in South Sudan, as is evident from the prominent role of Kenya in the Tumaini Initiative. The decision to extend the transitional period and postpone elections by an additional two years received differing reactions from the region.

46. In a statement from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Executive Secretary welcomed the "consensual manner" in which the decision had been taken and urged the Transitional Government of National Unity to make every effort to complete the implementation of the remaining tasks of the peace agreement in order to ensure that elections are held in a timely manner.<sup>68</sup> In the

<sup>61</sup> See annex 27.

<sup>62</sup> Interviews with parties engaged in the Tumaini Initiative, October 2024.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. Report by High-level Standing Committee, dated 7 October 2024, reviewed by the Panel.

<sup>64</sup> Interviews with parties engaged in the Tumaini Initiative, October 2024.

<sup>65</sup> Interview with a party to the Tumaini Initiative, October 2024.

<sup>66</sup> Interviews with Paul Malong (Ssi.008), October 2024.

<sup>67</sup> Interviews with parties engaged in the Tumaini Initiative, October 2024.

<sup>68</sup> IGAD, "IGAD Executive Secretary's Statement on the Extension of South Sudan's Transitional Period and Call for Renewed Efforts in Implementing the Revitalized Peace Agreement", 23 September 2024, available at <https://igad.int/igad-executive-secretarys-statement-on-the-extension-of-south-sudans-transitional-period-and-call-for-renewed-efforts-in-implementing-the-revitalised-peace-agreement/>.

statement, the Executive Secretary noted that this was the fourth postponement of elections and that a concrete plan of action was therefore now a matter of urgency.

47. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission offered a similar statement, taking note of the Government's decision to extend the transitional period, while calling for concrete steps to fully implement the peace agreement.<sup>69</sup>

48. A joint statement by the African Union Mission in South Sudan, IGAD and UNMISS noted that it was necessary to extend the transitional period for a second time because of "the failure to implement outstanding critical benchmarks."<sup>70</sup>

## **B. Engagement with regional States**

49. The leadership of South Sudan, and the President in particular, has continued a programme of regional engagement, with the conflict in the Sudan and the relationship of South Sudan with Uganda emerging as particularly prominent.

50. As the Panel has previously reported, the Government of South Sudan remains engaged in efforts to mediate the conflict in the Sudan, including through several meetings between the President and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chairman of the Sudan Sovereign Council. The two leaders discussed a joint plan to protect the transit of South Sudan oil exports and address the humanitarian crisis in the Sudan, as well as joint security issues, including cross-border crime.<sup>71</sup>

51. Interviews conducted by the Panel indicate that elements of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) remain present in parts of Western Bahr el Ghazal State, while Juba's ongoing relationship with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North,<sup>72</sup> the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and RSF remain important, especially with respect to the transit of South Sudanese oil.<sup>73</sup>

52. The appointment on 26 March 2024 of Lawrence Korbandy of South Sudan, a close ally of the President, as the IGAD Special Envoy for the Sudan has brought further hope for a prominent South Sudanese role in brokering a resolution to the conflict in the Sudan.<sup>74</sup>

53. The leadership of South Sudan has also continued its engagement with Ethiopia, including with respect to the construction of infrastructure, such as roads, and an alternative route for the transportation of South Sudanese oil through Ethiopia to Djibouti.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>69</sup> African Union, "AUC Chairperson statement regarding the extended political transition in South Sudan", 21 September 2024, available at <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240921/chairperson-statement-regarding-extended-political-transition-south-sudan>.

<sup>70</sup> See <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/joint-press-release-aumiss-igad-and-unmiss-note-decision-to-extend-transitional-period-of>.

<sup>71</sup> Statements by the Office of the President, on file with the Panel.

<sup>72</sup> See S/2023/922 and S/2024/343.

<sup>73</sup> Interviews with international and local observers, local government officials, representatives of foreign armed groups present in South Sudan and civilians who have interacted with RSF forces in South Sudan, May and October 2024.

<sup>74</sup> IGAD, "IGAD Executive Secretary Announces the Appointment of Hon. Lawrence Korbandy as Special Envoy for Sudan", 26 March 2024, available at <https://igad.int/igad-appoints-hon-lawrence-korbandy-as-special-envoy-for-sudan/>.

<sup>75</sup> See Sudan Tribune, "Ethiopia, South Sudan agree to build alternate oil pipeline route", 7 July 2024; and Eye Radio, "Ethiopia challenges South Sudan to road construction race", 15 February 2024.

## V. Arms

### A. Presence of Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces in South Sudanese territory

54. The Panel has documented significant military activity by members of the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF) in at least three areas of South Sudan. In each of the cases, at least some UPDF forces were armed with lethal military equipment. In paragraph 4 of its resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), most recently renewed by resolution [2731 \(2024\)](#), the Security Council prohibits the transfer of lethal military equipment to South Sudanese territory.<sup>76</sup> As such, the UPDF presence in South Sudan amounts to a violation of the arms embargo.

55. In two Equatorial states that border Uganda, several deployments appear linked to local border demarcation conflicts.

56. In August 2024, for example, several armed UPDF soldiers temporarily detained between 6 and 12 civilians in Kajo Keji county, in Central Equatoria State, following local tensions centred on a road construction project whose contractors were being protected by UPDF. Ugandan soldiers are said to have claimed that the land was part of Uganda.<sup>77</sup> In a subsequent statement, local South Sudanese authorities listed more than 100 villages in Kajo Keji county that they alleged were regularly encroached by Ugandan forces.<sup>78</sup>

57. Armed UPDF soldiers "in full combat [gear]"<sup>79</sup> were also reported to have entered locations in Eastern Equatoria State "in big trucks"<sup>80</sup> during July 2024. The soldiers were accused by local communities of conducting patrols and of harassing and displacing civilians. Representatives of SSPDF claimed UPDF had detained several of its soldiers.<sup>81</sup> In one incident in July, between 11 and 21 South Sudanese nationals in Eastern Equatoria State were killed by Ugandan forces and later accused of being poachers.<sup>82</sup>

58. On 28 September 2024, the SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces, Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004), travelled to Uganda to meet with his UPDF counterpart, General Muhoozi Kainerugaba.<sup>83</sup> In a press release, SSPDF noted that the parties had agreed that the "UPDF stops further encroachment on South Sudan territories."<sup>84</sup>

59. Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004) has been subject to a travel ban since 1 July 2015, further to the sanctions regime established by the Security Council in its resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#). No exemption request was submitted further to the provisions of

<sup>76</sup> The Panel has documented several such violations, including in [S/2020/342](#), [S/2020/1141](#), [S/2019/897](#), and [S/2018/1049](#).

<sup>77</sup> Interviews with local government and youth representatives conducted by observers, reviewed by the Panel, August 2024. Corroborated by a video obtained by the Panel. See also annex 28. See also, Eye Radio, "Uganda provokes another encroachment in Kajo-Keji", 7 August 2024.

<sup>78</sup> See annex 29.

<sup>79</sup> Eye Radio, "UPDF rounds up Magwi villagers, threatens them to evacuate – official", 20 August 2024.

<sup>80</sup> Interview with a local observer in Eastern Equatoria State, October 2024. See also Eye Radio, "Ugandan army reportedly encroaches into South Sudan's Magwi", 11 July 2024.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. See also annex 30; and Radio Tamazuj, "South Sudan tells Uganda to free detained soldiers", 21 July 2024.

<sup>82</sup> Interview with a local observer in Eastern Equatoria State, October 2024. Corroborated by report by international observers, reviewed by the Panel, August 2024. See also, Eye Radio, "Ugandan wildlife rangers allegedly killed 21 S. Sudanese poachers", 23 July 2024, and Number One Citizen, "Budi murder: Lobong, ministers to face MPs", 30 July 2024.

<sup>83</sup> See annexes 31 and 32.

<sup>84</sup> See annex 31.



paragraph 11 of resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#), and his travel therefore amounts to a violation of the travel ban.

60. In parallel to cross-border tensions in the Equatorial states, substantial UPDF deployments were also documented by the Panel in July and August 2024 in Western Bahr el Ghazal State as part of joint operations with SSPDF and the South Sudan National Security Service.<sup>85</sup>

61. The Panel obtained testimony from a range of sources in the area, several of whom also described aircraft and helicopters that had been used to deploy Ugandan forces and equipment.<sup>86</sup> These were partially corroborated by photographs reviewed by the Panel. The Panel has identified at least one Ugandan-registered aircraft, a Lockheed L-100 Hercules cargo plane, frequently operating in the area at the time of the deployment.<sup>87</sup>

62. Some of the joint Ugandan and South Sudanese security operations have, reportedly, targeted elements of the Lord's Resistance Army operating in the border regions of the Central African Republic, South Sudan and the Sudan.<sup>88</sup>

63. Following local criticism of the deployment, as well as concerns about forces being drawn into a conflict with elements of the Sudanese RSF that have also been observed in the area, sources in the South Sudan security sector indicated that the National Security Service had dissuaded UPDF from establishing a more permanent presence in the area.<sup>89</sup>

## B. Procurement of military vehicles

64. On 13 August 2024, a private company located outside of South Sudan announced that it had “secured a deal to supply vehicles to the South Sudan Army” in support of its “operational needs.”<sup>90</sup>

65. On 19 August 2024, however, an SSPDF spokesperson refuted that claim.<sup>91</sup> SSPDF confirmed that the company had met with the SSPDF Director General for Procurement, but only for a general appraisal of the company's capabilities. In its refutation, SSPDF noted that “[it] is still under arms embargo,” suggesting some of the proposed vehicle supply may have fallen under the provisions of the arms embargo established pursuant to Security Council resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#), most recently renewed by resolution [2731 \(2024\)](#). The Panel has previously reported on the procurement of armoured personnel carriers in violation of the arms embargo.<sup>92</sup>

66. While the scope of the arms embargo established pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution [2428 \(2018\)](#) includes “military vehicles”, paragraph 5 (f) does allow for exemptions to these measures when approved in advance by the Committee. Paragraph 2 of Council resolution [2683 \(2023\)](#), most recently reaffirmed by paragraph 1 of resolution [2731 \(2024\)](#), also permits the import of “non-lethal”

<sup>85</sup> Interviews with three local observers and a security sector agent, October 2024. See also, Sudans Post, “Lawmaker says Kiir's office involved in Ugandan army encroachment”, 2 September 2024; and Radio Tamazuj, “Questions over presence of Ugandan soldiers in Raja”, 16 August 2024.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> See annex 33.

<sup>88</sup> Interviews with international and local observers and a security sector agent in Western Bahr el Ghazal State, October 2024. See also social media post by UPDF, 20 August 2024, available at [https://x.com/MODVA\\_UPDF/status/1825871279808729213](https://x.com/MODVA_UPDF/status/1825871279808729213).

<sup>89</sup> Interviews with two local observers and a security sector agent, October 2024.

<sup>90</sup> Public statements made by the company, later revised or deleted, on file with the Panel.

Confirmed also by correspondence with the company.

<sup>91</sup> See annex 34.

<sup>92</sup> See [S/2024/343](#), [S/2023/294](#) and [S/2022/359](#).



military equipment “solely in support of the implementation of the terms of the peace agreement” without the need for an exemption request or notification to the Committee.

67. In a constructive response to the Panel’s enquiry, the company stated that it had not discussed the supply of any vehicle categories that fall within the scope of the arms embargo and, in any case, had “decided that we should not move ahead with any further discussion of any kind.”<sup>93</sup>

### **C. Procurement of weapons by opposition groups**

68. The Panel is continuing to investigate efforts by opposition groups to procure arms in violation of the arms embargo. This includes efforts by Abraham Chol Keech and Peter Biar Ajak, both South Sudanese nationals, who were charged in March 2024 in the United States of America with conspiring to procure weapons with the intention of instigating a coup in South Sudan.<sup>94</sup> The two allegedly sought to procure a range of weapons, including FIM-92 “Stinger” man-portable air-defence systems<sup>95</sup> and M-67 grenades,<sup>96</sup> and had enquired about FGM-148 Javelin anti-tank weapons systems. According to court documents,<sup>97</sup> “the defendant repeatedly asked ... to obtain Stinger missile systems – to disable South Sudanese military helicopters. ... Similarly, the defendant also [stated] he needed anti-tank weapons to disable the 13 to 15 functioning tanks in South Sudan.” This shows particular concern for the SSPDF armoured and aerial capabilities.

## **VI. Finance and natural resources**

### **A. Continued disruption to oil exports**

69. On 25 September 2024, the South Sudan Minister for Finance and Planning, Marial Dongrin Ater, presented the budget for the 2024/25 financial year to the South Sudan Transitional National Legislative Assembly.<sup>98</sup> The Minister noted that, in February 2024, the pipeline that carries the country’s Dar blend crude oil to Port Sudan, in the Sudan, had been ruptured.<sup>99</sup> As a result, South Sudan crude oil exports had dropped from around 150,000 barrels a day to just 45,000 barrels per day. Given the centrality of oil exports to the country’s economy, the Minister emphasized that “the continued disruption of crude oil production and export is a national security matter.”<sup>100</sup>

70. On 20 October 2024, a delegation of South Sudanese officials travelled to Port Sudan to meet with Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Chair of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council, and other officials, to discuss efforts to repair the pipeline.<sup>101</sup> Sudanese officials told the visiting South Sudanese delegation that the necessary preparations had been made to resume exports of South Sudanese crude oil. Several experts

<sup>93</sup> Panel correspondence with the company.

<sup>94</sup> See [S/2024/343](#).

<sup>95</sup> Specifically, five man-portable air defence systems.

<sup>96</sup> See annex 35.

<sup>97</sup> See [www.pacermonitor.com/public/filings/DLKQXQ4Y/USA\\_v\\_Keech\\_et\\_al\\_azdce-24-00394\\_0022.0.pdf](http://www.pacermonitor.com/public/filings/DLKQXQ4Y/USA_v_Keech_et_al_azdce-24-00394_0022.0.pdf).

<sup>98</sup> Budget speech for the fiscal year 2024/2025, dated 25 September 2024, on file with the Panel. The budget was presented late, as the 2024/25 financial year started on 1 July 2024. As of October 2024, the second reading of the budget was yet to take place.

<sup>99</sup> See [S/2023/922](#) and [S/2024/343](#).

<sup>100</sup> Budget speech for the fiscal year 2024/2025, dated 25 September 2024, on file with the Panel.

<sup>101</sup> Statement by the Office of President of South Sudan.

confirmed to the Panel that technical repairs had likely been completed, but noted that it may take some additional time to fully flush the repaired pipeline and to restore full production in the Upper Nile oil fields, where a number of subcontractors had been demobilized.<sup>102</sup>

71. A more significant obstacle is, however, to find a political agreement with respect to sharing the revenues from any resumed oil exports between the parties to the conflict in the Sudan.<sup>103</sup> Interviews conducted by the Panel indicate that SAF have sought to renegotiate the fees South Sudan must pay for use of the pipeline and other oil infrastructure, while RSF representatives have also demanded a share of any resumed oil exports.<sup>104</sup>

72. Ongoing disruption to oil exports from South Sudan have encouraged the Government to consider alternative export routes, including the construction of a new pipeline to Djibouti.<sup>105</sup> Efforts have also been made to diversify the revenue base of South Sudan, with gold mining, in particular, identified as a priority by both national and local government officials.<sup>106</sup>

## **B. Increased competition for oil revenues in Juba**

73. In the absence of Dar blend oil exports, competition has increased for control of the one to two cargos<sup>107</sup> of Nile blend oil the Government can still bring to market each month.<sup>108</sup> While the official auction process is used to set the price of oil cargos, individuals within the Office of the President often decide which companies are ultimately awarded the cargo.<sup>109</sup>

74. The proceeds of Nile blend cargos have typically been allocated to the oil-for-roads programme primarily contracted to a company controlled by one of the President's special envoys.<sup>110</sup> Members of the South Sudan Parliament and several government ministries have, however, urged the suspension of these payments in favour of salaries and other essential government expenditure.<sup>111</sup> International commodity traders have also continued their practice of pre-paying for future cargos of crude oil several months in advance.<sup>112</sup>

75. At the same time, a number of South Sudanese companies have been allocated control of cargos of oil and have attempted to sell these into the market, while

<sup>102</sup> Interviews with South Sudanese and Sudanese officials and participants in the South Sudanese oil industry, September and October 2024. At the time of writing, in October 2024, exports had not resumed.

<sup>103</sup> See [S/2023/922](#).

<sup>104</sup> Interviews with South Sudanese and Sudanese officials and participants in the South Sudanese oil industry, September and October 2024. The 2024/25 South Sudan budget assumes fees of around \$52 million will be paid to the Sudan.

<sup>105</sup> Interviews with government officials and oil industry actors, October 2024. See also Eye Radio, "Sudan makes preparations to export South Sudan crude oil", 21 October 2024.

<sup>106</sup> Interviews with government officials and civil society. See also Number One Citizen Daily, "Kapoeta gold rush: South Sudan's silent trade that fuels inequality", 7 September 2024.

<sup>107</sup> A cargo of crude oil is around 600,000 barrels.

<sup>108</sup> Interviews with individuals with knowledge of the South Sudan oil industry, September and October 2024.

<sup>109</sup> Interviews with government officials and private sector actors, corroborated by documents reviewed by the Panel, September and October 2024.

<sup>110</sup> See [S/2024/343](#).

<sup>111</sup> Interviews with representatives of the private sector and civil society, September and October 2024. See also, for example, Number One Citizen Daily, "MP proposes suspension of Oil for roads project fund", 5 September 2024.

<sup>112</sup> Interviews with individuals with knowledge of the South Sudan oil industry, September and October 2024.

retaining the proceeds as payment for goods and services they have provided to the Government.<sup>113</sup> One such company identifies itself as a construction company, but is managed by two individuals previously associated with a company that facilitated the import of armoured personnel carriers into South Sudan.<sup>114</sup> Another such company is managed by the former Executive Director of the Office of the President. Neither company features on the list of approved bidders for South Sudanese oil, with one cargo of oil awarded to the latter company later revoked for this reason.<sup>115</sup>

76. Article 4.8.1.10 of the South Sudan peace agreement, as well section 6.2 of the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, both stipulate that all oil related payments must be paid into a single oil revenue account and do not permit buyers to make direct payments to private companies in exchange for government oil.<sup>116</sup>

77. The economic impact of reduced oil revenues is only partially acknowledged in the 2024/25 budget of South Sudan.<sup>117</sup> While the budget projects total government revenues of SSP 2.6 trillion, total spending is budgeted at SSP 4.1 trillion. This leaves almost half of planned expenditure unfunded if oil exports are not fully restored. Over one third of the total budget is allocated to paying salaries, including arrears, with around 70 per cent of salaries paid to the security sector. The budget also remains heavily weighted towards the institutions that employ those engaged in the peace process, with the budget of the Parliament almost three times that of the entire health sector.<sup>118</sup>

## VII. Conclusion

78. The leaders of South Sudan are grappling with multiple compounding challenges. Some are self-inflicted, while others are the result of significant external shocks. Sustained regional and international support will be required to ensure meaningful progress is made towards the implementation of the reforms that will be necessary to rebuild the population's confidence in their Government while facilitating humanitarian relief and sustainable development.

## VIII. Recommendations

79. The Panel of Experts recommends that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [2206 \(2015\)](#) concerning South Sudan encourage the Government of South Sudan to:

(a) Make every effort to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid by eliminating bureaucratic impediments, preventing attacks on humanitarians and their assets and facilitating unhindered movement across all regions, including along the Nile River;

(b) Make every effort to allocate all resources necessary to complete the training and deployment of the remaining Necessary Unified Forces, harmonize its command structure and discourage further defections during the transitional period;

(c) Further to the possible resumption of Dar blend oil exports, resume the regular publication of oil marketing reports, further to chapter 9 of the country's

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> See [S/2024/343](#) and annex 36.

<sup>115</sup> See annex 36.

<sup>116</sup> See also annex 37.

<sup>117</sup> Budget for the fiscal year 2024/25, as presented to Parliament on 25 September 2024.

<sup>118</sup> See also annex 38.

Petroleum Revenue Management Act,<sup>119</sup> as well as other budget documents, including quarterly expenditure reports.

80. The Panel of Experts recommends that the Committee encourage the Government of Uganda to make use of the exemption procedures outlined in Security Council resolutions [2206 \(2015\)](#) and [2428 \(2018\)](#), most recently extended by resolution [2731 \(2024\)](#), if considering the transfer of lethal military equipment to the territory of South Sudan and if facilitating the travel of individuals subject to the restrictive measures established by those resolutions.

81. The Panel of Experts recommends that the Committee consider developing an implementation assistance notice for the arms embargo that provides additional information, also for the benefit of the Government of South Sudan and potential suppliers, about the terms “non-lethal military equipment” and “solely in support of the implementation of the provisions of the peace agreement”, particularly with respect to vehicles utilized by the military and police.

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<sup>119</sup> See annex 37.

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**Annex 1: List of abbreviations**

IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
NAS	National Salvation Front/Army
NASU	National Salvation United Forces
NSS	National Security Service
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM/A-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition
SPLM-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition
SSPDF	South Sudan People's Defence Forces
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Forces

## Annex 2: Partial data on flood-related impacts

The following is representative data of the impact of flooding. It does not capture the full extent of the impacts.

### Reported displacement:<sup>120</sup>

- About 271,000 displaced by floods across South Sudan as of mid-October
- Jonglei – Tens of thousands reported displaced in Pochalla, Ayod, Twic East, Urur, Fangak in September
- Northern Bahr el Ghazal – almost 155,000 people impacted across four counties in September
- More than 6,000 flood-displaced households identified in Unity state in September
- In parts of Upper Nile, figures of flood and conflict displaced people revised to nearly 20,000 in September

### Impact on schools:

- 127 schools reported damaged in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in September 2024<sup>121</sup>
- In Unity, 65 schools submerged due to floods, affecting 20,214 students<sup>122</sup>

### Impact on health facilities:

- 29 health facilities damaged in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in September 2024<sup>123</sup>
- 58 health facilities submerged in five counties, and nearly 90 others inaccessible<sup>124</sup>

### Impact on water points:

- 103 water points rendered unusable in Northern Bahr el Ghazal in September 2024<sup>125</sup>

### Impact on agriculture and farmlands:

- 53,100 farmers and cattle keepers lost crops and livestock in September<sup>126</sup>
- In Mayendit County, Unity State, about 4,275 hectares of farmland submerged as of mid-September<sup>127</sup>
- In Jur River in Western Bahr el Ghazal, more than 150,000 acres of farmland were destroyed<sup>128</sup>

<sup>120</sup> UN OCHA, South Sudan: Floods Snapshot (as of 18 October 2024), available from: <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-floods-snapshot-18-october-2024> and UN OCHA South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 5 (as of 25 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-5-25-september-2024>

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> UN OCHA, South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 4 (As of 18 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-4-18-september-2024>

<sup>123</sup> UN OCHA South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 5 (as of 25 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-5-25-september-2024>

<sup>124</sup> WHO, Severe flooding compounds health crisis in South Sudan, 21 October 2024: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/severe-flooding-compounds-health-crisis-south-sudan>

<sup>125</sup> UN OCHA South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 5 (as of 25 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-5-25-september-2024>

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> UN OCHA, South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 3 (as of 12 September 2024), available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-situation-flash-update-no-3-12-september-2024>

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.



### Annex 3: Images of flooding at Bentiu IDP camp and Rubkona airfield





Image depicts the airstrip in Rubkona, the UNMISS Internally Displaced Persons camp, and the UNMISS base, all in Unity State, surrounded by water. Image date 28 October 2024.

Source: Planet Labs PBC

**Annex 4: Press statement on waterway dredging, issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 8 June 2022**




screening of the project sites there after develop TORs for the conduct of the ESIA and any relevant studies. Following the development of the TORs, a tender for the conduct of the ESIA will be advertised and Environmental Firms or Individual consultants will bid and those vetted and deemed qualified by the ministry will be awarded the contracts to conduct the assessments and studies. They will then submit their reports to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry for review and endorsement. If the report(s) concludes that the projects have no, minimal or severe environmental or social impacts, with recommended mitigation measures in place, then a letter of no Objection will be issued and the project will commence.


Therefore since the above process has not commenced, any dredging of the rivers is illegal.

On the resumption of the Jonglei Canal to drain the Sudd Wetland to mitigate floods, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry will not approve the resumption or completion of the Canal because of the Ecosystems services that Sudd provides to our nation, the region and the world.

Finally rest assured that such projects are not the remit of a single ministry and that's why as a cross-cutting ministry with the mandate of protecting and conserving our environment, no project with such a magnitude without the clearance of the ministry is to be implemented.





## Annex 5: Image of waterways in Unity State



Source: Planet Labs PBC. Image date 28 October 2024

Partial river clearing operations were conducted downstream (north) on the Bahr el Ghazal River, which flows past Bentiu town in Unity State. However, the accumulation of vegetation upstream, near the low-lying bridge, has blocked water flow into the dredged sections of the river.

**Annex 6: Republican orders reshuffling senior SSPDF command positions, October 2024**





REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
The President

RSS/RO/J/13/2024

7<sup>th</sup> October 2024

**TRANSFER OF AN OFFICER FROM THE TIGER DIVISION OF THE  
SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES (SSPDF) TO THE  
GENERAL HEAD QUARTERS OF THE SSPDF.**

Pursuant to the Provisions of Section 27(1) of the Sudan People's Liberation Army Act, 2009, I, Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan, the Commander-In-Chief of the SSPDF do hereby **Transfer Maj. Gen. Lual Wek Guem Maroldit from being the Commander of Tiger Division of the SSPDF to the General Head Quarters of the SSPDF.**

*Signed under my Hand and the Seal of the Republic of South Sudan in Juba, this Seventh Day of the Month of October in the Year 2024.*

**Salva Kiir Mayardit,  
President,  
Commander -In- Chief of the SSPDF,  
Republic of South Sudan,  
Juba.**

**SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES**

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS**

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCES FOR ADMINISTRATION, PERSONNEL AND FINANCE

10<sup>th</sup> October, 2024,

FROM: A/CDF FOR ADMINISTRATION, PERSONNEL & FINANCE  
TO: ALL UNITS  
RPT: DIRECTOR FOR OFFICERS AFFAIRS  
RPT: GROUND FORCE COMMANDER

INFO: ALL A/CDFS  
INFO: CMI  
INFO: IG  
INFO: D/CDF  
INFO: CDF

REFERENCE TO THE REPUBLICAN ORDER NO, RSS/RO/J/13/2024 AND  
RSS/RO/J/14/2024 FOR THE RESHUFFLING DEPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER OF TWO  
OFFICERS WITHIN THE SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLES DEFENCE FORCES (SSPDF) AS HERE  
UNDER AND IT HAS COME INTO FORCE WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT.

1. MAJ. GEN LUAL WEK GUEM TRANSFER FROM TIGER DIVISION TO 1<sup>st</sup>  
INFANTRY DIVISION AS COMMANDER
2. MAJ. GEN "PSC" ABRAHAM GUM MAKUAC TRANSFER FROM 1<sup>st</sup>  
INFANTRY DIVISION TO TIGER DIVISION AS COMMANDER.

THEREFORE, THE TWO ABOVE MENTIONED SENIOR OFFICERS ARE DIRECTED TO  
EXECUTE THIS ORDER ACCORDINGLY TO HANDOVER AND TAKEOVER  
IMMEDIATELY.

I CONGRATULATES, THEM AND BEST WISH ON THEIR NEW RESPECTIVE  
OBLIGATION:

THIS IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION

For *[Signature]*

LT. GEN MALUAL MAJOK CIENGKUACH JOK  
A/CDF FOR ADMINISTRATION, PERSONNEL & FINANCE

CC: FILE

*[Circular Stamp: OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF DEFENCE FORCES FOR ADMINISTRATION, PERSONNEL AND FINANCE, SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, Juba, 10 OCT 2024]*

*[Handwritten: 10/10/2024]*

*[Handwritten: ALL UNITS]*

*[Handwritten: 10/10/2024]*

Office of Assistant Chief of Defence Forces for Administration, Personnel and Finance  
South Sudan People's Defence Forces, General Headquarters- Juba



**Annex 7: Statement by former Director General of the Internal Security Bureau,  
10 October 2024**

10<sup>th</sup> October, 2024

**Subject: Letter of Appreciation to H.E. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit,  
President and C-In-C of SSPDF and all other Organized Forces,  
Republic of South Sudan**

First and foremost, I would like to appreciate H.E. the President for the opportunity and the trust he bestowed upon me during my thirteen (13) years of service as the Director General of the Internal Security Bureau (ISB).

Your Excellency, it was an honour to serve under your Comradeship in one of the most sensitive and important institutions in the country. It was through your guidance and directives, that I was able to deliver and achieve some of the assigned tasks within the Service. I have cherished every moment of it.

Secondly, H.E. the President is a mentor and one of the role models who, without his unwavering support, I would not have succeeded in the Service during my tenure.

Despite my little disappointment following my recent appointment to the Gubernatorial position as Governor of Warrap State, its subsequent revocation and the ensuing rumours flying around, I want to assure the public that I am one of those cadres trained, tested, committed and loyal to the Revolution. I will never deviate from the line of the Revolution. One of the basic principles of the cadres of the Revolution is that a cadre is the first to attack and the last to withdraw. We are still at the phase of being attacked as a Revolution and therefore I will be the last to withdraw.

Lastly, allow me to reiterate to your top echelon, my sincere gratitude and steadfastness in supporting your able leadership.

Kind Regards,

 10/10/2024

**Gen. Akol Koor Kuc,**

Former DG of ISB and also Former Governor-Designate of Warrap State

**Annex 8: Partial list of known defections from the National Salvation Front (NAS)**

In May 2023, operational commander John Latio Kenyi Loburong defected from NAS to government.

In February 2024, Kennedy Kenyi “Warrior” Abdu Lopiong defected to government.

In May 2024, nine commissioned and non-commissioned NAS officers defected and joined the SSPDF in Yei.<sup>129</sup>

In August 2024, forces under the command of former NAS zonal commander, Emmanuel Salah Juma, deployed under the command of the SSPDF to Dollo Payam in Central Equatoria.<sup>130</sup>

On 9 September, Asiki Samson, a former SPLA-IO and SSNMC commander who later joined NAS, split from NAS and offered to join the SSPDF in Morobo in southern Central Equatoria.<sup>131</sup>


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<sup>129</sup> Reports from field observers in Yei, obtained by the Panel, May 2024. See also, No. 1 Citizen, NAS officers denounce rebellion, 7 May 2024: <https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2024/05/07/nas-officers-denounce-rebellion/>

<sup>130</sup> Field report by international monitors, obtained by the Panel, August 2024. See also, South Sudan Broadcasting Corporation, 1,500 NAS soldiers join SSPDF in Kudra, Central Equatoria, 17 August 2024: [https://www.farsightmediawatch.com/index.php/editorial/view\\_clip\\_email/779593/56/0](https://www.farsightmediawatch.com/index.php/editorial/view_clip_email/779593/56/0)

<sup>131</sup> Reports from local observers, September 2024. Interview with Thomas Cirillo, October 2024. See also, No. 1 Citizen, Morobo receives NAS defectors, 25 September 2024: <https://onecitizendaily.com/index.php/2024/09/25/morobo-receives-nas-defectors/>

## Annex 9: Parliamentary summons letter, 29 May 2024



For the purpose of this meeting, the following TNLA's specialized Committees and representatives of relevant institutions and Mechanisms shall be invited:

1. Public Accounts Committee (PAC), (four members)
2. Finance and Planning Committee (FPC), (Four members)
3. Governance Assurance, Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (GAME), (four members)
4. National Constitution Review Commission (NCRC), (two Members)
5. National Constitutional Amendment Committee (NCAC), (two members)
6. Judicial Reform Committee (JRC), (two members)


The meeting shall take place on:

Date: Monday, 3<sup>rd</sup> June, 2024

Time: 3:00 Pm

Venue: TNLA's Blue Room

Best Regards



Rt. Hon Oyet Nathaniel Pierino  
First Deputy Speaker  
TNLA/RSS/Juba



Cc: Rt. Hon Speaker  
Cc: Rt. Hon Deputy Speaker for Administration and Finance  
Cc: Rt. Hon Deputy Speaker for Welfare  
Cc: Clerk  
Cc: Legal Advisor  
Cc: NCRC, NCAC, JRC  
CC: TNLA's PAC, GAME, Finance and Planning.  
Cc: File

## Annex 10: Summary Report on the payment of \$10 million to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, 6 June 2024



**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**  
**TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY**  
**First Deputy Speaker**

Date: 6<sup>th</sup> June 2024

**SUMMARY REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE TNLA LEADERSHIP WITH THE MINISTERS OF FINANCE AND PLANNING, JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CABINET AFFAIRS AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE BANK OF SOUTH SUDAN ON THE PAYMENT OF USD 10,000,000 (SSP: 15,322,939,000) TO THE MINISTRY OF CABINET AFFAIRS TO FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PRIORITY PROVISION OF THE R-ARCSS AND THE ROADMAP SPECIAL PROJECTS**

### INTRODUCTION

1. The TNLA received petition from the beneficiary institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms in late April 2024 regarding controversial payments of USD 10,000,000 allocated to NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc.
2. The TNLA made consultations with relevant institutions including the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, Ministry of Finance and Planning, the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Bank of South Sudan etc on the credibility of the petition and the report of payments.
3. The TNLA obtained a letter of the Ministry of Finance and Planning, Referenced: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024, addressed to Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, with the Subject; "Authorization to transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account Number 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects".
4. The letter from the Ministry of Finance and Planning indicated that the fund in question was to facilitate the implementation of the priority provisions of the R-ARCSS and the Special Projects of the Roadmap. Attached to the letter was a document of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs outlining allocations to the following beneficiary institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms:



Page 1 of 5

Email: [nla1stdeputyspeaker@gmail.com](mailto:nla1stdeputyspeaker@gmail.com) | Telephone: +211 (0) 920 085 551

S/No	Institutions	Total amount in USD	Total amount in SSP
1.	National Constitutional Amendment Committee	1,871,340	1,871,340,000
2.	Constitutional Making Process (10% the of budget)	3,583,887.73	3,583,887,725
3.	National Human Right Council	1,052,000	1,052,000,000
4.	Judicial Reform Committee	999,380	999,380,000
5.	2022/2023 Roadmap Arrears	1,000,000	1,000,000,000
6.	Popularization of the Agreement on the Roadmap (R-ARCSS)	945,871.57	945,871,575

#### AUTHORITY AND MANDATE

5. Pursuant to TCRSS, 2011 (as amended), Article 82 (1) (3), and the TNLA Conduct of Business Regulations, 2011 (Amended 2021), Regulations; 8(1)(c)(d), 133, 134 & 135, the TNLA leadership involving relevant Specialized Committees of Public Accounts (PAC), Finance and Economic Planning, Government Assurances, Monitoring and Evaluation (GAME) convened a meeting on 29<sup>th</sup> May 2024 and summoned the Ministers of Cabinet Affairs, Finance and Planning, Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and the Governor of the Bank of South Sudan to clarify and resolved the matter of payments to the relevant institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanism; NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. The representatives of these beneficiary Institutions and mechanisms were also invited.

#### FINDINGS

The outcome of the meeting of the First Summon which was attended by the Ministers of Finance and Planning, Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and the Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, representatives of the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC and JRC, and the Second Summon for the Minister of Cabinet affairs which was attended also by representatives of the aforementioned beneficiary institutions and the Minister of Cabinet Affairs were as follows:

- 1) **Confirmation** by the Ministry of Finance and Planning of the letter of the Ministry of Finance referenced NF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024 addressed to Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, Subject; "Authorization to Transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account No 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects"
- 2) **Confirmation** by the Bank of South Sudan of receipt of the letter from the Ministry of Finance referenced NF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024 addressed to the Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, Subject; "Authorization to Transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account No 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects' SSP Account (General Secretariat) 00269122001036.
- 3) **Confirmation** that, on the 8<sup>th</sup> April 2024, an equivalent of SSP 15,322,939,000 was deposited in SSP Account No. 00269122001036 of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) using the bank buying rate of SSP/USD 1532.2939
- 4) **Confirmation that** on 16<sup>th</sup> April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received payment request from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account-

Page 2 of 5



- 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD 1,050,000- Equivalent of SSP: 1,657,154,415, as cash withdrawal using bank official selling of SSP/USD 1578.2423
- 5) **Confirmation that** on 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received another payment request from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account- 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD 2,000,000- Equivalent of SSP: 3,157,071,600 as cash withdrawal using bank official selling of SSP/USD 1578.5358
  - 6) **Confirmation that** on 13<sup>th</sup> May 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received authorization from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account- 00269122001036 to transfer the amount of SSP: 10,460,570,724.85 to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Project SSP Account No. 00269121269233
  - 7) **Confirmation that** from date 13<sup>th</sup> – 31<sup>st</sup> May 2024, several transactions (Withdrawals) occurred on the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs- Special Project Account totaling to SSP: 1,580,719,803.83
  - 8) **Confirmation that** as of 31<sup>st</sup> May 2024, the remaining balance in the Special Project Account-00269121269233 of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, is SSP: 8,879,850,921.02, roughly equivalent to USD 5,627,281.95
  - 9) **The Minister of Cabinet Affairs stated that:**
    - a. An equivalent of SSP: 15,322,939,000 was paid to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs' Accounts on 8<sup>th</sup> April 2024.
    - b. The purpose of the fund was for the facilitation of the activities of NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. outlined in the document attached to the payment request Referenced: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1, dated April 2, 2024, addressed to Honorable Governor of the Bank of South Sudan, with the Subject: "Authorization to transfer USD 10,000,000 from Account Number 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects"
    - c. Payments (withdrawals) from the Account Number 00269122001036, done on dates 16<sup>th</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2024 were made for the following additional projects that **were not** included in the attached documents in (b) above:
      - a) NAS peace implementation (USD 1,050,000- Equivalent of SSP: 1,657,154,415, using bank official selling rate of SSP/USD 1578.2423)
      - b) Phase II of Security Arrangement under the office of the Senior Presidential Advisor on Security, Hon. Tut Gatluak Manime (USD 2,000,000- Equivalent of SSP: 3,157,071,600 using bank official selling rate of SSP/USD 1578.5358)
      - c) The unspecified amount of payment for the **98R** Special projects
      - d) The Minister of Cabinet Affairs denied knowledge of the several transactions (withdrawals) that occurred on the Account 00269121269233, between dates 13<sup>th</sup> - 31<sup>st</sup> May 2024, totaling to SSP: 1,580,719,803.83.
    - d. The attached document to the payment request of 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2024 was reviewed by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs to ensure reduction of payments to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. which the Ministry of Cabinet communicated to the Ministry of Finance.
    - e. Finally, the Minister confirmed the remaining balance in the Special Project Account of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, Account No. 00269121269233 was SSP 8,879,850,921.02



- 10) **The TNLA observes** that, the fund in question meant to facilitate the implementation of the priority provisions of the R-ARCSS and the Roadmap special projects was first deposited in the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) Account-00269122001036 instead of the Ministry's Account 00269212279231 as per the letter of the Ministry of Finance and Planning dated 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2024. However TNLA cannot fault the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs since currency was changed from USD to SSP.
- 11) **The TNLA also observes** that, two transactions (withdrawals) were carried out by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs on the fund, under the Account- 00269122001036 on date 16<sup>th</sup> April 2024 and 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2024.
- 12) **The TNLA further observes** that, the balance of the fund SSP 10,460,570,724.85 was then moved from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Account (General Secretariat)-00269122001036 to the Ministry's Account for Special Projects SSP Account 00269121269233. The fund was already less by at least SSP 4,862,368,276.
- 13) **The TNLA is concerned** of the following:
- Despite the fund amounting to **USD 10,000,000** in its equivalent in **SSP 15,322,939,000** was transferred to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs' Account on 8<sup>th</sup> April 2024 and was to be paid to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc, some of these institutions and mechanisms were either partially paid their money or not at all.
  - The Ministry of Cabinet Affairs introduced payments for additional projects namely; NAS, High Level Committee (Office of the Senior Presidential Advisor on Security) and the **9BR** Special Projects against the funds meant for NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC, Popularization of the R-ARCSS Roadmap and payment of 2022/2023 Roadmap Arrears and these payments were done in full and as a matter of priority.
  - The Payments in (b) above has deviated from the purpose for which the fund was requested and paid by the Ministry of Finance and Planning in their letter dated 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2024, Referenced: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1 contravening the Public Finance Management and Accountability Act, 2011
  - The attached document to the payment request of 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2024 was reviewed by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs to ensure reduction of payments to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. which the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs communicated to the Ministry of Finance has total amount approximated USD 17,000,000 of which payments approximated USD 8,000,000 was expected from the Ministry of Finance and Planning. In light of this discrepancies of total amounts on documents not consistent with total amount of SSP: 15,322,939,000 requested and paid, therefore, the new claims of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs could not have been approved and authorized for payment by the Ministry of Finance and Planning.
  - The changes claimed by the Minister of Cabinet Affairs on the attached document to the payment request of 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2024 which reduced payments to the NCRC, NCAC, NHRC, JRC etc. was done without the resolution of the Council of Ministers hence this was unilateral and personal discretion of the Minister of Cabinet Affairs.





- f) In light of the above transactions (withdrawals), there is prima facie case of misappropriation of funds SSP: 15,322,939,000 (USD 10,000,000, @ bank buying rate of SSP/USD 1532.2939)

#### RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

In light of the above facts, the TNLA hereby directs the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs as follows:

1. To pay in full, all allocations due to the beneficiary institutions and peace implementation mechanisms as requested by the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs and paid by the Ministry of Finance.
2. To pay without further delay allocations due to the beneficiary institutions; NCRC, NCAC, NHRC and JRC etc.
3. Adhere to the principles of Public Finance Management and Accountability Act, 2011 including ensuring no diversion/misappropriation of funds once approved and paid to the spending agencies by the Ministry of Finance and Planning.
4. The Ministry of Cabinet Affairs has no authority to unilaterally divert funds meant for the aforementioned institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms as this contravenes Financial Regulations and the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, 2011
5. Decisions to allocate and pay funds to the beneficiary institutions and Peace Implementation Mechanisms was taken in the Council of Ministers meeting, the TNLA expects any change in the payment affecting the amount due the institutions and Mechanisms should be by a resolution of the Council of Ministers' meeting.
6. The Ministry of Finance and Planning to pay directly every spending agency through official Account rather than through a third party Institution. This shall ensure proper auditing and accountability by spending agencies as per the Constitution and the relevant laws.

Sign.....

Rt. Hon Oyot Nathaniel Pierro  
First Deputy Speaker  
TNLA/RSS/Juba



## Annex 11: Talking points for Deputy Speaker of Parliament, 3 May 2024

03-May-2024

### Talking Points

The Ministry of Finance and Planning has done an allocation of USD: 30,000,000.00 to some relevant institutions and Mechanisms as directed by them. The equivalent was allocated in SSP as of which the Ministry of Cabinet received an amount of USD: 10,000,000.00 in equivalent of SSP: 15,322,939,000.00

1. On the 02<sup>nd</sup> April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received Authorization Letter from the Ministry of Finance & Planning to Deposit the amount of USD: 10,000,000.00 to the SSP Account of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036.
2. On the 8<sup>th</sup> April 2024, an equivalent of SSP: 15,322,939,000.00 was deposited in SSP Account No: 00269122001036 of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) using the Bank buying rate of SSP/USD: 1532.2939.
3. On 16<sup>th</sup> April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received payment request from Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD: 1,050,000.00 - Equivalent of SSP: 1,657,154,415.00 - (Cash Withdrawal) using Bank Official Selling Rate of SSP/USD @ 1578.2423
4. On 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2024, the Bank of South Sudan received another payment request from Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036 for foreign exchange of USD: 2,000,000.00 - Equivalent of SSP: 3,157,071,600.00- (Cash Withdrawal) using Bank official Selling Rate of SSP/USD @ 1578.5358
5. On 13<sup>th</sup> May 2024., the Bank of South Sudan received another Authorization from the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs (General Secretariat) – 00269122001036 to transfer the Amount of SSP: 10,460,570,724.85 to the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Project SSP Account No:00269121269233.
6. From date 13<sup>th</sup> - 31<sup>st</sup> May 2024, several transactions (Withdrawal) occurred at the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs – Special Project Account Totalling to SSP: 1,580,719,803.83.
7. As of 31<sup>st</sup> May 2024, the remaining balance in the Special Project Account of the Ministry of Cabinet Affairs A/C No: 00269121269233 is SSP: 8,879,850,921.02

Kind Regards

**Annex 12: Authorization of transfer of \$10 million toward 'Special Projects' under Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, 2 April 2024**

REF: MF&P/RSS/J/20-D-1.

Date: April 2, 2024

Hon. Governor,  
Bank of South Sudan  
RSS-Juba

Subject: Authorization to transfer USD 10,000,000 from account number 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects

Dear Hon. Governor,


Reference to the above mentioned subject, we write to authorize the Bank of South Sudan to transfer the sum of USD 10,000,000 (Only Ten Million United States Dollar) from account 00269210001024 to Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects account below. Being funds required to facilitate the implementation the priority provisions and special projects.

Account Name: Ministry of Cabinet Affairs Special Projects  
Bank Name: Bank of South Sudan  
Account Number: 00269212279231

Please accept the assurances of our highest regards.


  
Malual Tap Dieu  
1st Undersecretary of Finance



  
Dheh Mayuol Tong  
Director General of Accounts

Cc: Hon. Minister of Finance & Planning  
Cc: Hon. Deputy Minister of Finance & Planning  
Cc: Director of Expenditure  
Cc: File.

## Annex 13: John Latio Kenyi Loburong's defection, 14 May 2023



Chief of the SSPDF and all other Organized Forces, with Dr. Martin Elia Lomurö, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs and Secretary General of High-Level Standing Committee for the implementation of the revitalized Agreement as the Mediator and Internal Guarantor.


5. Appoint Honourable Kawunda John Mogga as the NAS Chief negotiator and the Team Leader of the negotiations with the membership of the following:
  - (i) Major General Pitiya Yoane Suma. CDR Amadi and Dollo Area Command.
  - (ii) Brigadier General Kasbash John Darius-Secretary and CDR for Office Affairs and Dem Records.
  - (iii) Brigadier General Bingo Apolo Valentino-Commissioner Wonduruba Payam.
  - (iv) Brigadier General Alex Lomeling Martin. Coordinator and Finance Officer, Aru, Uganda.
6. Direct all NAS forces to allow unhindered and safe return of refugees from the neighbouring countries, and the internally displaced, to their areas of origin in order for them to engage in livelihood activities to alleviate hunger and poverty without any disturbance.

Issued under my hand and Seal of NAS today the 14<sup>th</sup> / 05 / 2024 in the NAS Headquarters.



Signed \_\_\_\_\_  
 General John Latio Kenyi (Kenyi Lo-Burong)  
 Chairman and Commander-in-Chief

**Annex 14: Roadmap of negotiations between Kenyi Loburong and the Government of South Sudan**



## 1. Introduction

General John Kenyi Latio, commonly known as Kenyi Lo-Burong, of NAS has taken a courageous decision opening talks directly with General Salva Kiir Mayardit, The President of the Republic of South Sudan. The decision came after several months of thought and consultation with Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro and Hon. Kawunda John Mogga in the United States of America, both of whom hail from the same constituency.

These thoughts and consultation focused on the untold suffering of the citizens in the war thorn areas specially and South Sudan in general. As a result General Kenyi Loburong and his brothers decided to have dialogue which triggered the government to send a delegation to meet with the delegation of General Kenyi Lo-burong, in Nairobi, Kenya. The objective is to understand the reasons which led to rebellion of General Kenyi Lo-Burong and his forces, their grievances and how to achieve genuine peace.

## 2. Background to the conflict between the Government of South Sudan and the National Salvation Front (NAS).

- 2.1 The current Government-NAS conflict has its roots as early as the 1960s. Everyone knows that the Any-anya-1 war was started by elders and leaders of Equatoria region and especially Poculum heroes like Aggrey Jaden and many others. Most of our elders and leaders joined the Any-anya-1 rebellion and continued struggling until the Addis Ababa agreement was signed of 1972. Thereafter, our people were side-lined and the movement was high jacked by Maulana Abel Allier and General Joseph Lagu Yanga and other Political Parties and Allies. As a result, most of the founders of the Any-anya-1 Movement found themselves out of the military and the government of the then Southern Sudan all together.
- 2.2 This political manipulation which occurred during the integration of the Any-anya-1 Forces was intended to marginalize those who fight and instead dominate the system by others with no compensation done to the war affected areas and to the fighters. A good number of the fighters were recruited as road laborers and forest guards and the heroes were not recognised up to now, especially a leader like Aggrey Jaden Wani.
- 2.3 It was thought that the Arab Policy of divide and rule applied on the leaders of the then Government of South Sudan. But, history repeated itself again as everyone knows that during the SPLA/M struggle, able Men, Women and Youth of the Pöjulu people and other Communities of Greater Equatoria joined only to be mistreated in the movement.



2.4 Our people stood firm by supporting the movement physically, politically and militarily making the SPLA/M strong enough and was able to control most of the areas till it gained independence of South Sudan. The Independence of South Sudan created hope that all our people will enjoy the fruits of the struggle. But to our surprise, the contrary became true and the situation became worse than during the Arab regime. The people of greater Equatoria, especially the Pöjulu who are known to be strong and brave politically and militarily, were purposely marginalized as follows:

- (i) Most of our leaders who were leading the movement were undeployed, side-lined, demoted, targeted, manhandled and eliminated by the same SPLM/A system which they fought for and supported wholeheartedly. The intention was to reduce their strength, demoralize and frustrate them so that they do not participate in the governance of the independent South Sudan which they died for.
- (ii) Our brave men who were in the struggle were then not considered during the integration into the military and the government in the eve of the CPA-2005 simply because they were from certain ethnic background. Most of them were said to be unfit, no unit and were stripped off their ranks just to demoralize them in order to abundant military. This was done in mid-SS by late General Salva Mathok-gendit and as a result most of them find their ways to their villages.
- (iii) Those who survived the process were intentionally deployed to the far end of South Sudan like Upper Nile, Unity and Bahr-el-Ghazal areas with their departure orders verbally stated as 'mission of no return'. Indeed, three quarters of them, if not all, died. Their orphans and widows are undergoing untold sufferings, left to be taken over by their colleagues.
- (iv) General Kenyi lo-Burong who was a roaring lion and great fighter controlling Central Equatoria, especially Greater Juba and most parts of Yei, remained unpromoted. Yet, even Former President Bashir knew him very well. Despite all of that, he did not give up and continued to sacrifice himself for the sake of the struggle of the people of South Sudan for independence.
- (v) General Kenyi lo-Burong was later promoted to the rank of 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt by General Abu John when he was the Governor of Equatoria. He felt unrecognized and discouraged and went to his village. Later, General Ladu Gore convinced him to return and promoted him to the rank of colonel and made him in charge of his forces in Luri. He was attacked in Luri and in his residence in Hai-Tarawa in Juba. Even then, he was captured and then





taken to prison in Yei where he spent years and again demoted to the rank of 1<sup>st</sup> Lt and deployed to Mogiri.

- (vi) Again, he was transferred and deployed to Police, where he was demoted to the rank of warrant officer. All these grievances forced him and those who went through the same treatment to demand justice, equality and freedom through the barrel of gun. So, when Dr. Riek Machar rebelled most of us joined his rebellion with the hope of getting their rights and liberating ourselves from the bad ideology of mischief, marginalization and domination by our fellow countrymen.
  - (vii) In SPLA-IO the same tactics of mischief, marginalization and domination by fellow South Sudanese was even worse. Killing, nepotism, tribalism and disregard of our military commanders by the entire leadership of the SPLM/A-IO was rampant. Logistics were only supplied to Upper Nile and hence Equatorians were left helpless struggling to arm ourselves. They carried assassinations attempts some of which succeeded and that angered us to have our own movement.
  - (viii) In view of the SPLM/A-IO treatment, General Kenyi Lo-Burong decided to form his own movement, which he deliberating decided not to disclose its name or declare its commencement. When suddenly General Thomas Cirillo Swaka rebelled and declared his movement on 6<sup>th</sup> March, 2017, he immediately engaged General Kenyi Lo-Burong to be the military wing of his movement, the National Salvation Front (NAS). It was not until 28<sup>th</sup> July, 2017, when General Kenyi Lo-Burong, who had already decided to form his own movement, accepted and announced joining NAS as the military wing.
  - (ix) Unfortunate, General Thomas Cirillo Swaka, who joined us in the bush has a hidden agenda and was not sincere to General Kenyi Lo-Burong. We discovered that he has no sincere political agenda for the welfare of the people of South Sudan and our own concerns. He clearly displays tribalism, nepotism and no care for the issues of the movement.
- 2.5 Therefore, General Kenyi Lo-Burong has taken the decision for genuine and wholistic peace in South Sudan by engaging in direct peace talks with President Salva Kiir Mayardit who he respects as a true SPLM/A separatist leader. It has become clear that there is no future in tribalism, nepotism and marginalization of a people in their own country.
- (i) General Kenyi Lo-Burong decided to join our brothers in good heart for peace so that so we together can give a massive support to our President and our elder Dr. Martin



Elia Lomuro in a move to open a new chapter of peace, reconciliation and development in our country instead of following leaders who are selfish and continue to cause destruction in the country.

- (iii) If general Thomas want to continue with war, he should form his own force but not using us as his tools to achieve his own selfish intension of wanting to gain big position in the government because we are tired of this game. In this regard we hope the government will negotiate with us in good faith so that we create a very strong alliance to defeat Dr. Riek Machar in the upcoming contested general election, in favour of President Salva Kiir Mayardit.

2.6 You have all witnessed the destruction of properties, loss of lives, displacement of people and the suffering of the civil population in the war affected areas. All these requires social services to be fixed in the country. What does this call for? That calls for honest and genuine peace and security so that the government can speed up the process of reconciliation and development. Hence, for genuine peace and security the NAS under the leadership of the General Kenyi Lo-Burong, demand the following:

- (i) Cessation of hostilities, ceasefire, separation and demonization of forces in their areas of control.
- (ii) Integration of our forces into all the Security Sectors i.e., SSPDF, National Security and other Organized Forces. The NAS, under General Kenyi Lo-Burong, demand for the confirmation of all ranks of its forces without compromise.
- (iii) The process of integration, disarmament, demotion and demobilization should be handled in a dignified manner to avoid internal dispute between different forces which will be integrated together as one national force.
- (iv) Most importantly, guarantee for the safety of our leadership and forces before, during and after the negotiation period in the town of negotiations to avoid the unnecessary danger.
- (v) Although the peace talks are direct between President Salva Kiir Mayardit and General Kenyi Lo-Burong, with Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro as the Mediator and Internal Guarantor on the side of the government and Hon. Kawunda John Mogga on the NAS side, we demand the Government of Uganda to be the over-all witness and guarantor as it is in the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.



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- (i) Based on our experience, we demand that our forces be integrated, trained and deployed in areas under NAS control until the end of the election period so that we support the democratic elections to defend our interest as well as the interest of the government in favour of President Salva Kiir Mayardit to defeat the SPLM/A-IO leader Dr. Riek Machar Teny.
- (ii) SPLA-IO battalion under the command of General John Mabie Gar should be relocated from Morobo county, Panyame Payam, because they are committing atrocities against the civilian population in those areas. They continue to loot civilian properties, murder, violently rape women and girls, and occupying civilian homes and social amenities causing displacement of inhabitants of the area to the refugees' camp, scaring returnees and inflicting more suffering to the civilians.
- (iii) All deployed SSPDF forces in civilian populated areas and social amenities should be redeployed to their previous designated military garrisons to pave way for returnees and displace persons to come back and secondly for our forces to have free movement in the process of assembling such that they are able to prepare themselves early enough to participate in upcoming general election.
- (iv) The areas are as follows: In Yei County they are Morsak, kejiko, Ombasi, Goja and Tokori. In Lainya County they are Kon-kat, Rejonga, America Anarat and Mongiling. In Morobo county they are Bura, Panyana, Udabi and other parts of Kaju-keji. Also, Mundari, Amadi, Maridi and parts of eastern Juba County.
- (v) Any confiscated property of those who rebelled and those who ran to the refugee's camp should be returned back to their owners without hindrance. This is a very vital step towards reconciliation and healing so that all will gain trust and believe in a meaningful agreement.
- (vi) Representation of NAS political Cadres in all levels of the government: National, State and County levels in order to work for federalism as a means of permanent peace in the Republic of South Sudan.
- (vii) Destroyed and targeted business men with fear of losing their lives and freedom of movement should be compensated and those who currently reside outside the country whose licenses were confiscated be returned to them so that they start business afresh in secure environment without any interference.



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- (viii) Government should evacuate **Mundari** and **Dinka Bor** cattle herder in Central Equatorial and take them back to their place to allow quick return of the refugees and displaced persons who are purely farmer to start cultivation in a peaceful environment.
- (ix) We demand the Government to reconsider Wonduruba as a county of its own in order to avoid further political dispute between the citizens of Lainya County and the Bari Community. Rokon should also be given a county of its own so that no one is not kept hostage by others in the so call Juba County because they are all equal citizens of South Sudan. They also deserve the same right like any other citizen of South Sudan so that everybody enjoy equal rights.
- (x) For the duration of the peace talks, the leadership of the NAS should be given the responsibility for their logistics to avoid the challenges being encountered by the current process of cantonment, training and deployment of the R-ARCSS forces.
- (xi) Our fallen comrades who fought tirelessly during the two civil wars deserves to be recognized and honored by including their names in historical statutes, such as Schools, Roads and other monuments, structures and Institutions in consultations with the Pojulu Community leadership.
- (xii) We demand that the Government of South Sudan build a mausoleum in the name of Pojulu people. Further, we demand upgrading of the historic Loka Secondary School into a University and the promised Dr. Samson Kwaje memorial agriculture institute be constructed in a memory of Aggrey Jaden, Dr Samson Kwaje Lukare and my other fallen heroes in Pojulu land.
- (xiii) The President through the Ministry of Humanitarian Affair and SSRRC should bring more Non-governmental Organisations, National NGOs and other organizations to provide services and other life support assistance to the war affected areas including destroyed social amenities. The Government should grant special sponsorship and scholarship for the benefit of those whose education was interrupted by the conflict.
- (xiv) In this regard, the President, through Dr. Marin Elia Lomurō who is our only trustworthy elder, should believe that we shall remain loyal to him and support him for permanent peace in the Republic of South Sudan and make sure he becomes more powerful.



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- (xv) The NAS under the leadership of General Kenyi Lo-burong submit these demands for negotiations in good faith and in the spirit of peace. May God bless our President, our country the Republic of South Sudan and our people




**General John Latio Kenyi (Kenyi Lo-Burong)**  
**Chairman and Commander-in-chief**

**Cc**

- President Salva Kiir Mayardit-President of the Republic of South Sudan.
- Dr. Martin Elia Lomuro-Minister of Cabinet Affairs and SG of the HLSC for R-ARCSS implementation.
- Honourable Kawunda John Mogga-NAS Chief Negotiator and Team Leader.
- File

**Annex 15: Negotiations between Kenyi Loburong and President Salva Kiir, 19 May 2023**



basis of the roadmap you sent him. As soon as you make the declaration, as per the copy attached to the roadmap, negotiation will commence.

Further, His Excellency the President has appointed Dr. Martin Elia Lomurö, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs and the Secretary General of High-level Standing Committee (HLSC) for the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement, as the Mediator and Guarantor for the peace negotiations between him and you. In due course, a team will be set-up to assist Dr. Lomurö with the negotiation process.


To this end General Kenyi-Loburong, please accept the gratitude of President Salva Kiir Mayardit and of the entire Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) for accepting peace and joining the R-TGoNU. We look forward to seeing you and your forces amidst our national security sector and government. Again, thank you for accepting peace and please accept the assurance of our highest consideration.

**Dr. Barnaba Marial Benjamin**  
Minister for Presidential Affairs,  
R-TGoNU, The Republic of South Sudan.

**Cc:**

- Salva Kiir Mayardit-President of the Republic of South Sudan.
- Dr. Martin Elia Lomurö-Minister of Cabinet Affairs and the Secretary General of High-level Standing Committee (HLSC) for the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement.
- Bishop Elias Taban, The Bishop of Presbyterian Church of South Sudan

**Annex 16: Partial Integration List of Kennedy Kenyi “Warrior” Abdu Lopiong’s forces into the SSPDF, 2 February 2024**



**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**  
The President

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**RSS/RD/J/33/2024**


**2<sup>nd</sup> February 2024**

**INTEGRATION OF OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS OF FORMER NAS SOLDIERS FROM LAINYA COUNTY OF CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE. INTO VARIOUS RANKS IN THE SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE’S DEFENCE FORCES (SSPDF).**

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army Act, 2009 (Amendment) Act, 2022, I, Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan and the Commander-In-Chief of the SSPDF, do hereby integrate and Commission **Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers of Former NAS Soldiers from Lainya County of Central Equatoria State, into Various Ranks in the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF)** as hereunder:

S/NO	Rank	Name in Full
1.	Brigadier	Kenned Kenyi Abdu Lopiong
2.	Lt. Colonel	Peter Jima Oliver Loboton
3.	Lt. Colonel	Peter-Lomoro Lotigo Kurispino
4.	Lt. Colonel	Kabash John Dario
5.	Major	Charles Wani Michael
6.	1 <sup>st</sup> Lieutenant	James Lusuku John Lokule
7.	1 <sup>st</sup> Lieutenant	Joseph Liwa Ely Duku

The President





8.	1 <sup>st</sup> Lieutenant	Kenyl John Martin
9.	1 <sup>st</sup> Lieutenant	Moses Hakim Pasquale
10.	1 <sup>st</sup> Lieutenant	Charles Nicola Julu
11.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Isaac Malish Confucius Luote
12.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Cosmos Alakai Live Martin
13.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Gatwech Guol Garang Long
14.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Charles Lubanga Paskal Lowate
15.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	John Salimba Emmanuel
16.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Angelo Lemi Bullen
17.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	James Kenyl Joseph
18.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Kuch Abut Maker Madoldit
19.	2 <sup>nd</sup> Lieutenant	Atem Malong Atem Maluk
20.	R/SM	Peter Lubang Charles
21.	R/SM	Robert Bida Martin Wani
22.	R/SM	Both Nyang Deng Padlet
23.	R/SM	Dominic Bittenson Lawyer
24.	R/SM	Sallah Isaac Mick
25.	R/SM	Kenyl John Emmanuel
26.	R/SM	Stephen Wujugu Stanley
27.	R/SM	John Luka Samuel
28.	R/SM	Charles Lujang Mathew
29.	S/M	Morris Malesh Lora Sebit
30.	S/M	Peter Data Justin Davis


SKM

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The President

54.	Pvt	James Yap Diet Yuot
55.	Pvt	Justin Bidai Alex
56.	Pvt	David Loputu Lizira
57.	Pvt	David Lado Jacob
58.	Pvt	Samuel Lokudu Gore
59.	Pvt	Essien Oliver Taban
60.	Pvt	Lomom Wilson Steven
61.	Pvt	Denis Bidai Steven
62.	Pvt	Emmanuel Lukudu James


Issued under my Hand and the Seal of the Republic of South Sudan in Juba,  
this Second-Day of the Month of February in the Year 2024.

  
Salva Kiir Mayardit,  
President,  
Commander-In-Chief of the SSPDF,  
Republic of South Sudan,  
Juba.


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The President

## Annex 17: Press statement by the Central Equatoria State Government, 10 October 2024



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE  
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION



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For immediate Release

October 10, 2024

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OFFICE OF THE MINISTER

**Press Statement on the Tragic Massacre of Youth in Wonduruba Administrative Payam and Kulipapa (Jebel Iraq).**

On October 09, 2024 the Government of Central Equatoria learnt with shock the horrific massacre of 10 youth in Wonduruba Administrative Payam, and 9 others in Kulipapa (Jebel Iraq) of Ganji Payam Juba County the victims lost their lives in an absurd act of violence and cowardice targeting innocent civilians on Wednesday night, preliminary reports indicate that the attack took place when armed individuals targeted the youth and shoot at them while others were hacked by machetes and murdered in cold blood.

The Government of Central Equatoria State expresses its deepest sorrow and condemnation over the horrific massacre, this heinous act which occurred is a grave violation of rights and a threat to peace and stability of the people of Central Equatoria and South Sudan as a whole and will not go unabated.



The state government, in collaboration with national authorities and security forces, will work together in conducting investigations to identify those responsible for this barbaric act and hence assure the public that swift and decisive action will be taken to ensure justice and peace will prevail accordingly.

The Central Equatoria State Government under the leadership of the Governor, HE. Gen. Augustino Jadalla Kamilo Wani, extends its deepest condolences to the families of the victims. Our thoughts and prayers are with the entire people of Wonduruba, Kulipapa (Ganji Payam) and the state at large as it grieves this profound loss, equally the state Government reaffirms its commitment to ensuring a peaceful and secure conditions for all its citizens warranting that violence in any form will not be tolerated.

May the souls of the deceased rest in eternal peace, and may we find strength and unity in this time of sorrow.

**Hon. Gerald Francis,**

Minister of Peacebuilding and Acting Minister of Information and Communication  
Central Equatoria State/Juba

**Ministries Road, West of State Secretariat – CES**

## Annex 18: Reaction from the Pujulu community in Juba, 14 October 2024



Date: 14-10-2024

**Subject:** Condemnation on the Killings of the Twenty-one (21) and Wounding of Four (4) Innocent Civilians in Wonduruba Administrative Payam and Jebel Iraq at Ganyi Payam.

Pojulu Community is mourning the brutal murdering of over twenty-one (21) innocent civilians and wounding of four (4) in Wonduruba Administrative Payam and road travelers at Kulipapa (Jebel Iraq) Ganji Payam in Juba County, in Central Equatoria State and on the 9<sup>th</sup> of October 2024 immediately after the returned of Governor from Wonduruba.

During the visit of H. E. Governor Augustino Jadalla Kamilo Wani and accompanying delegations to Lainya and Wonduruba respectively, Governor has stressed a clear message for durable peace prospect to the citizens and assured them on the President H.E. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit efforts in engaging the holdout oppositions through Tumaini peace initiative currently taking place in Nairobi Kenya. Also, H.E. Governor echoed publically to the citizens of Lainya County and Wonduruba Administrative Payam on the general Amnesty declared by our President H.E. Gen. Salva Kiir Mayardit in 2017 in Yei which still holding up to now as way of restoring peace in the State.

H.E. Governor left Wonduruba on the 8<sup>th</sup> of October 2024 and immediately on the next day Wednesday on the 9<sup>th</sup> of October 2024 Government Forces, from the Ground Unit including Bridger Gen. Kennedy Kenyi Abdu popularly known as "Kenyi Warrior", clashed around Wonduruba Administrative Payam with the holdout rebels groups under John Kenyi Lotio popularly known as "Kenyi Loburong". In the fight Officers belonging to the ground forces at Jebel Iraq were killed in that joint operations. Casualties on the rebel side are unknow to us. As a result of receiving the sad news of their killed officers in those operations on the same date the 9<sup>th</sup> of October 2024 at 02:00 pm, Government Forces from the Ground Unit at Kulipapa reacted massively by; arresting, torturing and massacring the motorists and travelers from Juba to Lainya and vice-versa killing eleven (11) travelers.

Page 1 of 2

Only four bodies of civilians were recovered through the efforts from Lainya County and Juba County Commissioners and four bodies were handed over to the grieved families but the rest were not found their where-about. Then at 04:00 pm the Ground Unit elements took seven motorcycles of those killed victims each bike carrying three armed officers backed by one Toyota Land Crusher pickup full with armed SSPDF officers moving to Wonduruba very fast via Lainya and the convoy was seen by the civilians in Lainya. Upon their arrivals to Wonduruba at night the same Government Forces from the Ground Unit at Kulipapa carried out systematic house to house arrests, handcuffed and dragged those unarmed civilians to the road side and all were executed through shootings while others hacked by the machetes on the road side killing ten (10) civilians and wounded four (4) who are under treatment in Yei.


The entire Pojulu Community was outraged and saddened by such barbaric and illegitimate actions committed by the Government Forces from the Ground Unit at Kulipapa. Totally and Heartily, Pojulu Community everywhere strongly expressed their greatest disappointments over the grossly execution of the unarmed civilians who were massacred in cold blood at Jebel Iraq in Juba County and Wonduruba Administrative Payam.

Therefore, we call our State and national governments to uphold to the constitution and take serious measures to bring the culprits to the book. On the other hand, Pojulu Community leaderships argue everyone to remain calm and not to take law into their own hands as we pursue justice to prevail through the State and National Government to investigate and bring all the culprits to face the law.

Also, Pojulu Community argues the State and national governments to provide security to allow the grieved families to search for the missing bodies in Jebel Iraq for decent burial. Finally, on the behalf of the Pojulu Community we would like to extend our deepest heartbroken sympathies and condolences to the families of those massacred innocent souls and their forcefully departure.


May Almighty God and Our Lord Jesus Christ consoles the entire Pojulu Community and South Sudanese for these un-wanted deaths.

Yours in grief


  
**Mr. Lole Laila Lole**  
 D/Chairman of Pojulu Community  
 Juba, South Sudan



## Annex 19: Reaction from the Wonduruba Community Association in Juba, 12 October, 2024



## Annex 20: Reaction from the Central Equatoria State Youth Union, 10 October, 2024




**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**

**CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE**

**YOUTH UNION**

*United Youth for Sustainable Development*



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**CHAIRPERSON**

Date: 10. 10. 2024

**#PRESS RELEASE#**

**CONDEMNATION ON THE KILLING OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS IN JEBEL IRAQ AND WONDURUBA ADMINISTRATIVE AREA PAYAM**

On behalf of **Central Equatoria State Youth** we want to express our profound condemnation of the recent acts of violence that have resulted in the tragic loss of innocent civilian lives killed by cowardice act of terror.


The indiscriminate targeting of civilians is a violation of fundamental Human rights and international Humanitarian Law. Such actions are not only morally reprehensible but also constitute war crimes against humanity under the Geneva Conventions.

The ongoing violence in our state has inflicted unimaginable suffering on countless families, leaving communities shattered and lives forever altered. There is absolutely no justification for attacks that deliberately target innocent individuals, and it is imperative that government should hold accountable those who perpetrate such heinous acts.

The protection of civilian lives must be a priority for all parties involved in any conflict. As members of these state, we have a collective responsibility to advocate for peace and to ensure that the voices of the youth and innocent people are heard. We must call for an immediate investigation and the perpetrators must face the full force of law.

Therefore, we call upon our leaders in the state and representative of international community to take a firm stand against the killing of innocent civilians and to advocate for measures that protect human life and promote peace.

###END##



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**Tel: +211 926 666 939 | +211 982 380 000**

**Email: ccsyouthunion@gmail.com**

**CES Youth Training Center - Hai Neem, Juba - South Sudan.**

**Annex 21: Photographs of victims of killings in Wondoruba, Central Equatoria State**

Images widely circulated in South Sudan, and corroborated by representatives from civil society organizations and members of the local Pujulu community. Injuries indicate victims were tied and shot or hacked to death by blunt instruments, including possibly machetes<sup>132</sup>



<sup>132</sup> Interview with a medical professional, October 2024



## Annex 22: Press release by the National Salvation United Forces, 10 October 2024



**OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON  
National Salvation United Forces; Hope General Headquarters  
South Sudan**

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Ref: nasu/osp/02/024

Date: 10/10/2024

***For Immediate Press Release***

In their continuing offensive against the National Salvation United Forces (NASU), which started September 5, 2024, the SSPDF and the allied Militia of Dr. Martin Elias Lomuro on October 7 pulled out from Mile 58 Juba Lainya road to attack our bases in wonduruba and Lainya counties for the 4<sup>th</sup> time in row. On the same day they proceeded to open a base at Logoko, in logwerle boma close to our locations.

At around 4 pm while the Governor of Central Equatoria State was addressing the people in Wonduruba centre, the hungry SSPDF and their militia rolled out and attack us at our base. Our gallant forces fought back in defense and forced them to retreat to their base in Logoko leaving behind one dead and several others injured. Wednesday October 8, 2024 early morning they again attack us. This time our forces fought hitting hard, killing 7 at the spot, over ran their newly established base, and burn down 1 land cruiser vehicle which was rushing reinforcement to the besiege forces. Finally the force was defeated and the remnants flee to Wonduruba town in panic. Five of them died in hospital meaning a total 13 traitors have been eliminated while none was killed or injured on our side.


At around 10 pm, 3 motor bikes, a fighter tank, and truck arrived wonduruba centre from Lainya town to collect those who are injured. They decided to launch a revenge attacks on innocent civilian who had gathered to mourn a dead family member. The mourners were rounded up and the youth were picked, some were collected from their rooms while sleeping tied up and were either shot or hacked by machetes. 10 innocent youth were killed in cold blood, with reasons that they are either related to General Kenyi Loburong or a member of his clan. If John Kenyi is a rebel, then his family members are all rebels as well?

This is what the Mathiang Anyoor fighters are encouraged to do by the clan government in J1 after defeat. Kenyi Warrior is implementing this strategy in

Wonduruba and Lainya counties because earlier he called our command and told us that he has been instructed by CDF, Dr Martin, Ambrose, and Gen Toy to clear us from these areas in 6 months. Why can't they face us instead of killing the innocent people who they claim to protect.

NASU leadership, urges the people of South Sudan to condemn this heinous crime perpetuated by the failed government in Juba. We call upon the Human right organizations, The Troika, peace monitors to investigate these atrocities done to the innocent people of wonduruba and to call for the release of those who are innocently being detained for simply being people from the area. The NASU forces remains committed to seeking for a durable peace for the well-being of all South Sudanese people.

Thank,

  
Maj Gen. Paul Gideon Subian  
Spokesperson  
NASU



**Annex 23: NAS press release concerning defections, 13 October 2024**

**SOUTH SUDAN**  
Restoring Unity & Dignity of the People  
**National Salvation Front/ Army**  
**OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON**  
**General Headquarters**

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Ref: NAS/OSM/12

13th October, 2024.

**FOR IMMEDIATE PRESS RELEASE**

The Leadership of National Salvation Front (NAS) is very much appalled by the horrendous mass murder of innocent civilians in Wonduruba Payam, Juba County, Central Equatoria State, by the South Sudan Defense Force (SSPDF) allied militia, commanded by Brig. Kennedy Kenyi (aka Kenyi Warrior) and funded by Cabinet Minister Martin Elia Lomuro.

On 8<sup>th</sup> October, the SSPDF and militia under Brig. Kenyi Warrior massacred ten (10) innocent boys who were arrested while participating in a funeral occasion. This came as a revenge for the defeat of the SSPDF and their militia by forces under Gen. Kenyi John Loburon. The SSPDF out of frustration turned against the innocent civilians as a result executing ten (10) young boys in cold blood.


Following this outrageous massacre, the Leadership of NAS would like therefore to state the following;

- 01- NAS condemns in the strongest terms possible the mass murder and mafia-style cold blood execution of these innocent boys by the SSPDF and their allied militia under the command of Brig. Kennedy Kenyi (Kenyi Warrior).
- 02- NAS holds the commander of SSPDF in Lainya, the militia commander Brig. Kenyi Warrior, the militia funder Dr. Martin Elia and coordinator Mr. John Lomeling Kaunda (an American citizen) as aiders and accomplices of this heinous crime.
- 03- NAS cautions the people of South Sudan on complacency towards the existence of the illegal and unconstitutional tribal regime of Salva Kiir that relishes to loot, displace, rape and kill the people of South Sudan.

Email: samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk

- 04- The Leadership of NAS appeals to the youth, especially those who are being targeted, to join the ranks of NAS and resist the brutality of the regime and its militia or else form vigilante groups to defend their villages from the marauding SSPDF and the murderous militia.
- 05- NAS calls on civil society and International Human Rights Organization to pursue the case against the murderers of these innocent people and their accomplices to ensure that the criminals are brought to justice
- 06- NAS Leadership appeals to Community members to reject the evil plans by the regime of Salva Kiir and its agents of planting seeds of hatred and disunity among the communities while they continue to rule over weak and divided communities. Community members and Leaders therefore, need to exercise maximum restraint as they work to contain this situation.
- 07- NAS Leadership stands in solidarity with the Pojulu community and the people of Wonduruba, sends its condolences to the families of those who have lost their dears ones and pray that the souls of these innocent boys' rest in Eternal peace.

**Suba Samuel Manase**  
Spokesperson,  
National Salvation Front, NAS



Email: [samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk](mailto:samuelsuba@yahoo.co.uk)

## Annex 24: Appointment of Commissioners to the NAS Federal Civil Authority, 7 September 2024



Date: 7 September 2024

**Subject: Appointments of Commissioners for NAS Federal Civil Authority.**

Pursuant to Articles 25(14)/33(2) of the Constitution of National Salvation Front (NAS) 2024, I, **Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka**, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the National Salvation Front (NAS), do hereby issue the following Constitutional Order:

*Constitutional Order No. 10/07/09//2024*

- (1) Appointments of Commissioners for NAS Federal Civil Authority, as provided on the list of Compatriots below:

NAMES	PORTFOLIO
1. Mr. Felix Charles Ali Bilal	Commissioner for Federal Governance Affairs
2. Amb. Lado Gubek	Commissioner for International Relations
3. Amb. Daniel Lee	Commissioner for Information, Mass Communication and Cultural Affairs
4. Mr. Turjuman Ramadan	Commissioner for Legal Affairs and Human Rights
5. Mr. Bosco Otim Mario	Commissioner for Finance and Resource Mobilisation
6. Mr. Robert Samson Lugga	Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs
7. Dr Wani Lolik	Commissioner for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
8. Mrs. Vera Mahdi	Commissioner for Health

**NAS**

NAMES	PORTFOLIO
9. Dr Lokuowe Gordon	Commissioner for Education, Social Welfare and Gender
10. Dr Peter Pitya	Commissioner for Infrastructure and Physical Planning

These appointments come into effect from 7<sup>th</sup> Day of September 2024.

I cordially congratulate you on these appointments in recognition of your diligence and commitments to work for the salvation of the people of South Sudan and wish you success in advancing the vision, mission and objectives of NAS.



**Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka**  
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief  
National Salvation Front (NAS).

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**NAS**

## Annex 25: Appointment of Commissioner General of NAS Federal Civil Authority, 4 May 2024



**General Headquarters**  
Office of the Chairman and Commander-in-Chief

Date: 14<sup>th</sup> May 2024.

**Subject: Appointment of Commissioner General of NAS Federal Civil Authority**

Pursuant to Articles 25(14)/33(1) of the Constitution of National Salvation Front (NAS) 2024, I, **Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka**, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of the National Salvation Front (NAS), do hereby issue the following Constitutional Order:

*Constitutional Order No. 07/14/05/2024*

- (1) The appointment of Compatriot **Isaac Ajiba Ochang**, as the Commissioner General of NAS Federal Civil Authority.

This appointment comes into effect from 14<sup>th</sup> Day of May 2024.

I cordially congratulate you on this appointment in recognition of your diligence and commitment to the work for the salvation of the people of South Sudan and wish you success in advancing the vision, mission and objectives of NAS.

**Gen. Thomas Cirillo Swaka**  
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief  
National Salvation Front (NAS).



**NAS**

facilitation required to ensure that the NIOC performs its functions and duties; and

- 6.1.14 The NIOC shall provide monthly reports to the NLC, the TNLA and the Tumaini Initiative on the progress in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus.

## 6.2 External Guarantors / Observers

**THAT** the Parties and Stakeholders agree to the formation of the High-Level Panel of Heads of State and Government which shall be composed of Heads of State and Government from the region, and Partners and Friends of South Sudan, whose core roles and responsibilities shall be:

- 6.2.1 To steward, monitor and oversee the implementation of all measures, processes, and activities specified in the Tumaini Consensus, in liaison with the National Leadership Council;
- 6.2.2 To receive and consider reports regarding implementation of the Tumaini Consensus from the Tumaini Initiative;
- 6.2.3 To organize, in coordination with the Tumaini Initiative, high-level visits to South Sudan to assess the progress of the implementation of this and other related protocols from the Tumaini Consensus;

*Protocols for Implementing - Tumaini Consensus*

Handwritten initials: SBR, PS, NB, GLB, PER, P.A.G.

- 6.2.4 To review briefs and reports and to engage with the East African Community (EAC), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), African Union (AU), Troika, European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), Community of Saint-Egidio, and Friends of South Sudan, as well as other regional and international bodies and partners on the process of implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.2.5 To advise and recommend actions to be taken for the proper and timely implementation of the Tumaini Consensus; and

- 6.2.6 To convene Quarterly meetings, or on a need basis, between the Tumaini Initiative and the National Leadership Council to appraise the progress of implementation of the Tumaini Consensus.

*Protocols for Implementing - Tumaini Consensus*

Handwritten initials: SBR, PS, NB, GLB, PER, P.A.G.

List of People to Initial the Tumaini Consensus Protocols - 15 July 2024

Name	Representative Organization	Initial
Hon. Amb. Abino Mathom	Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity, Head of Delegation	A/H
Gen. Pagan Amos Okoth	South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA), Chairman, Real-SPLM	PS
Gen. Paul Maling Awan	South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA), Chairman and C-in-C, South Sudan United Front, Army	PS
Gen. Stephen Bury Nuteyeng	South Sudan United National Alliance (SSUNA), Chairman and C-in-C	SBR
Gen. Mario Loka Thomas Jado	South Sudan People's Movement / Army	PER
Dr Pauline Riak	National Salvation Front - Revolutionary Command Council, Chairman and C-in-C	PER
Patrick Godi	Youth	P.A.G.
Bridget Ngonoro	Women	N.B.
Geoffrey Lou Duke	Civil Society	GLB
Bishop Moses Deng	Faith Based	PS
Sheikh Jaraleto Khamsi	Faith Based	PS
Gen. Kari Aguer Kuri	People's Coalition for Civil Action	PS
Li Gen. Lazaro Serebelywa (Rtd)	Chief Mediator	PS
Amb. Dr. Mohamed Ali Gyo	Deputy Chief Mediator	PS
Amb. Ismail Waini	IGAD Special Envoy to South Sudan, Co-mediator	PS
Pablo Impaglastra	Community of Saint-Egidio, Co-mediator	PS
Dr. A. Korie Singde	USIA, State Department of Foreign Affairs, Principal Secretary	PS

*Protocols for Implementing - Tumaini Consensus*


Handwritten initials: GLB, PS, PER, P.A.G.



## Annex 26: Tumaini protocols, 15 July 2024

**HIGH LEVEL MEDIATION**  
**"TUMAINI INITIATIVE"**  
**FOR SOUTH SUDAN**

*Tumaini Initiative*



**TUMAINI CONSENSUS**  
**FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN SOUTH SUDAN**

**PROTOCOLS FOR INITIALING**

Nairobi, 15 July 2024

Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, G.D., R.M., P.S., N.B., M.A., P.A.G., PER, and others.

AA

**Preamble**

**WHEREAS** H.E. General Salva Kiir Mayardit, the President of the Republic of South Sudan requested his brother, H.E. Dr. William Samoei Ruto, President of the Republic of Kenya to mediate between the Government and South Sudan Opposition Groups;

**WHEREAS** the Government of the Republic of Kenya accepted to facilitate the mediation of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan through the High-Level Mediation "Tumaini Initiative" for South Sudan that took place in Nairobi, Kenya;

**AWARE** that the Tumaini Consensus resolves the conflict between the Revitalized-Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGONU), South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance (SSOMA) and other opposition groups, to achieve inclusive peace in the Republic of South Sudan, and that the ongoing, pending programs in Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), and newly established programs in the Tumaini Consensus, shall provide the framework for peacebuilding and democratization in South Sudan;

**RECALLING and RECOGNISING** previous and current agreements, consensus and understandings to cease violence, pursue peaceful resolutions of conflicts, and the commitments to build a stable, peaceful, united and prosperous South Sudan;

**MINDFUL** of the devastation, distraction and disruption of lives and livelihoods, loss of lives and property, and other damages that have occurred as a result of past and current conflicts and the continued suffering of communities, families and individuals that still suffer the effects of the conflicts and natural calamities;

**ACKNOWLEDGING** the efforts, commitments, and progress made by the leadership, partners, friends and the people of South Sudan to

Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, G.D., R.M., P.S., N.B., M.A., P.A.G., PER, and others.

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achieve peace, build a better country and secure a future for the coming generations;

**CONSCIOUS** that much still remains to be done in order to heal the wounds of the past, ensure reconciliation, consolidate peace, restore stability, and put in place developmental programs, and strengthen systems of governance to ensure advancement and growth;

**CONVINCED** that consolidation of peace and effective pursuit of growth and advancement of South Sudan is only possible where the diversity of the people in and outside South Sudan, are recognized and brought together in an all-inclusive process of nation-building;

**PERSUADED** that the envisaged reforms, democratic transition, and changes towards a better South Sudan shall be achieved through a comprehensive and all-inclusive Tumaini Consensus and R-ARCSS;

**MINDFUL** of the importance of confidence and trust-building measures, implementation modalities, and other steps for guaranteeing commitment and realization of peace;

**RECOGNIZING** the importance of gender parity and empowerment in all spaces and committed to promote intergenerational considerations, the Parties commit to ensure representation of youth, persons with special needs, and at least 35% of women across public institutions;

**FURTHER COMMITTED** to the Tumaini Initiative, resolution of the conflict, and the consolidation of durable peace in South Sudan; and

**COGNIZANT** that Federal system is a popular demand of the people of South Sudan and the constitution shall be drafted based on Federal arrangements and structures.

Handwritten signatures and initials: SBR, G.D., R.M., P.S., N.B., M.A., P.A.G., PER, and others.

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**Statement of Purpose**

The Tumaini (Hope) Initiative acknowledges that the protracted political conflicts in South Sudan have compromised the wellbeing of the citizens of South Sudan. The future of current and coming generations is bleak if efforts to achieve and protect sustainable peace fail.

Recognizing that past agreements to end conflicts and sustain peace have not registered adequate success, the Tumaini Initiative now presents an opportunity to build consensus among the Parties and Stakeholders.

The aim of this consensus is to attain sustainable peace and democracy by implementing agreed interim programs. The roadmap to sustainable peace in the Republic of South Sudan comprises, *inter alia*, a Permanent Constitution making process with self-executing mechanisms, which addresses root causes of conflicts, and will provide the means for inclusive development and provision of services to all citizens in all corners of South Sudan.

This roadmap comprises several elements:

**First** Trust and Confidence Building measures are required among all Parties and Stakeholders. Some undertakings from previous agreements were not completed because not everyone kept the promise. This Framework presents strong mechanisms for building trust and confidence so as to implement agreed programs and collectively make a Permanent Constitution for South Sudan and secure sustainable peace.

**Second** the urgent need for enhanced civilian protection and support to humanitarian efforts. There are many citizens in need of relief assistance because of floods, droughts, and displacement by violent conflicts. All Parties and Stakeholders have a moral obligation and duty to mobilize resources to address the

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humanitarian crises and natural calamities.

**Third** the need for establishing an inclusive government and firming the basis for responsibility sharing. Politics of inclusion and sharing responsibilities hold the key to peace building and good governance.

**Fourth** fostering ceasefire, undertaking security arrangements and reforms. The Parties and Stakeholders recognize that the integration of the various armed groups is key to addressing political instability.

**Fifth** implementing economic recovery programs and institutional reforms to manage public resources will be prioritized to realize the dividends of peace and development.

**Sixth** implementing programs for resolving community conflicts and land related disputes to achieve sustainable peace, security and stability.

**Seventh** national healing, truth, and reconciliation programs to be undertaken throughout the country to heal the wounds inflicted by the conflicts among our people in order to restore the broken social fabric.

**Eighth** the Permanent Constitution Making Process as part of this consensus will consider past and present challenges, provide a strong and inclusive foundation for stability, wellbeing of citizens, sustainable development and build a society founded on democratic values, rights and freedoms.

**Ninth** the Tumaini Initiative in coordination with the Parties, Stakeholders and development partners will convene a donor conference to mobilize technical and financial resources for peace building, post-conflict reconstruction of war affected areas from the region and the international community.

The Tumaini Initiative shall guarantee **PERMANENT PEACE, STABILITY, and SHARED PROSPERITY.**

*Protocol for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*

SBR PM G.D. P.J. N.B. P.A.G.

**NOW THEREFORE**, we the negotiating Parties and Stakeholders of the Tumaini Initiative convened in Nairobi, Kenya, resolve as follows:

## 1. General Principles

**THAT** the Parties and Stakeholders agree and commit to the following general principles that shall guide the interpretation and implementation of the commitments under the Tumaini Consensus:

- 1.1 Respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of South Sudan and its people demonstrated through a people-centered and inclusive Permanent Constitution Making Process;
- 1.2 Enhanced civilian protection and secured access to emergency humanitarian and other assistance particularly to vulnerable population including displaced persons, returnees and refugees;
- 1.3 Commitment to a genuine national healing and reconciliation and the building of enduring trust and confidence in South Sudanese society founded on the principles of justice, equality, human dignity, and the advancement of societal welfare;
- 1.4 Strict adherence to constitutional guarantees for equitable representation of all South Sudanese in public institutions and particularly to achieve representation of youth, persons with special needs, and at least 35% of women across public institutions;

*Protocol for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*

SBR PM G.D. P.J. N.B. P.A.G.

1.5 Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression, association, assembly and movement for the people of South Sudan, as shall be regulated by law;

1.6 Protection of press freedoms and widening of civic and political space in the country, as shall be regulated by law;

1.7 Strengthen commitment to sustaining cessation of hostilities and permanent ceasefire during the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus and beyond;

1.8 Mutual commitment to the Tumaini Consensus, its principles, and structures, including agreement on its guarantors and measures to assure implementation, processes, and timelines;

1.9 Mutual respect and tolerance, respect for opinions, transparency, respect for the rule of law, accountability, the unfettered access to relevant information and commitment to building of consensus;

1.10 Enhance the decentralized system of government during the transitional period and expedite the process of constitution-making to realize the popular demand of the people of South Sudan to establish a federal system of government; and

1.11 Parliament shall enact enabling laws and amend existing laws to be in conformity with the Tumaini Consensus and Transitional Constitution of South Sudan 2011 (as amended).

*Protocol for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*

SBR PM G.D. P.J. N.B. P.A.G.

## 2. Protocol on Humanitarian Access and Support

**THAT** the Parties and Stakeholders reiterate their commitment to creating an enabling political, administrative, operational and legal environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection of vulnerable communities, humanitarian workers and individuals in South Sudan.

The Parties and Stakeholders agree as follows to:

- 2.1 Commit to the facilitation and provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need of such assistance as a result of previous and current conflicts, natural disasters and other factors;
- 2.2 Strengthen the safeguard measures to returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and their families, the reinstatement of their properties in accordance with their constitutional rights and applicable legislations, rules and regulations and full reintegration to their communities or residence of their choice;
- 2.3 Establish, continue and enhance Quick Impact Programs and service delivery targeting vulnerable groups affected by conflict and natural disasters including children, orphans, women, widows, persons with special needs, and war-wounded; and
- 2.4 Establish and allocate adequate resources to the Special Reconstruction Fund (SRF) and appoint a credible management for the Fund to ensure efficiency and effectiveness.

*Protocol for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus*

SBR PM G.D. P.J. N.B. P.A.G.

### 3. Protocol on Trust and Confidence-Building Measures

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders, as a gesture of their commitment to the Tumaini Initiative, create a conducive atmosphere for the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus and R-ARCSS that will lead to the adoption of a Permanent Constitution for the Republic of South Sudan, agree to the immediate implementation of the following measures after the signing of the Tumaini Consensus:

- 3.1 Release all the political detainees and prisoners of war (POWs) and dismiss all the cases and charges on persons accused as a result of politically motivated factors;
- 3.2 Expedite the repeal of Sections 54, 55 and 57 of the National Security Act 2014 so as to conform with the provisions of the Constitution, R-ARCSS and the Tumaini Consensus before the commencement of the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;
- 3.3 Refrain from arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentions;
- 3.4 The Government shall take immediate and appropriate measures to fully guarantee the freedom of movement of political leaders, in and outside South Sudan;
- 3.5 The Government shall take immediate and appropriate measures to fully guarantee, without exception, the freedom of association and assembly of all persons in South Sudan, in conformity with the Constitution and the law;

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

- 3.6 The Government shall take immediate and appropriate measures to fully guarantee, without exception, the freedom of expression of all persons in South Sudan, including freedom of the media, and equal access for all to the State Media;
- 3.7 The Parties and Stakeholders or their representatives in the Tumaini Initiative, shall make a confidence-building visit to Juba, South Sudan to hold joint public forums, to publicize, and to commit to the Tumaini Initiative;
- 3.8 The Government leadership or their representatives, shall make a confidence-building visit to Nairobi, Kenya to support and commit to the Tumaini Initiative;
- 3.9 The Government shall protect property rights and guarantee security of property and assets of the Government, groups, and individuals in South Sudan, irrespective of their political affiliations;
- 3.10 The Tumaini Initiative to convene a National Leadership retreat inside South Sudan after the signing of the Tumaini Consensus for sensitization and confidence building; and
- 3.11 National Prayers for peace shall be organized and held by the religious leaders after the signing of the Tumaini Consensus in Juba, the States and the Administrative Areas.

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

### 4. Protocol on Permanent Ceasefire, Security Arrangements and Reforms

THAT the Parties recommit to the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) (2017), and commit to a permanent ceasefire agreement that shall be agreed in the Tumaini Consensus. The Parties commit to the reform and reorganization of the Security Sector in order to create unified professional national forces that include the Armed Opposition Groups.

THAT to achieve unification of forces, all the mechanisms below shall be reconstituted to ensure inclusion of the Armed Opposition Groups. The defections of security elements or forces shall not be allowed during the Transitional Period and all Armed Forces shall remain under their respective command pending their unification. The Officers from Tumaini Parties shall be included in the existing Unified Command.

#### 4.1 Security Sector Reform / Oversight Commission (SSROC)

4.1.1 A Security Sector Reform / Oversight Commission (SSROC) shall be established to conduct reforms by overseeing, directing and supervising the security sector reform during the Transitional Period;

4.1.2 The SSROC shall be headed by a neutral and competent South Sudanese security / military expert who shall be vetted by the National Leadership Council (NLC);

4.1.3 The SSROC shall be further composed of the following:

- 4.1.3.1 Representatives of the Parties and Stakeholders signatory to Tumaini Consensus and R-ARCSS
- 4.1.3.2 South Sudanese military and security experts
- 4.1.3.3 South Sudanese eminent personalities / academics
- 4.1.3.4 Regional and international experts

4.1.4 The Mandate of the SSROC shall be to:

- 4.1.4.1 Oversee the assembly and cantonment/barracking of all security forces, organization, screening, training, unification, deployment and provision of logistics in cantonment sites, barracks and movement of forces as per Joint Defense and Security Board (JDSB) program, including among others;
- 4.1.4.2 Oversee the disarmament and ending of private militias through the JDSB and create political space that promotes peace, national unity, equal opportunity and democratic processes to address underlying issues that drive conflicts;
- 4.1.4.3 Oversee and ensure the deployment of Armed forces across the country and at the borders to maintain the territorial integrity of the Republic of South Sudan;
- 4.1.4.4 Oversee the simultaneous general disarmament, and destruction of the arms collected from civilians using the unified security forces across the country;
- 4.1.4.5 Oversee the assembly and cantonment/barracking of forces, organization, screening, training, unification and deployment of all Unified Forces shall be completed within a specified period from the date of signing of the Tumaini Consensus;
- 4.1.4.6 Ensure fair treatment of all the security forces including their remuneration during the training;
- 4.1.4.7 Receive progress reports from mechanisms tasked with security reform processes;
- 4.1.4.8 Report to the National Leadership Council (NLC);

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaini Consensus

4.1.4.9 Supervise and oversee the screening of unfit personnel by the JDSB, and coordinate with the DDR Commission on their demobilization and reintegration; and

4.1.4.10 Direct and supervise the establishment of the Committees for Defense and Security which shall be Chaired by the respective heads of the Defense and Security Mechanisms in the JDSB;

4.1.4.11 The Committees of the JDSB shall be as follows:

4.1.4.11.1 Defense/Military;

4.1.4.11.2 Police Service;

4.1.4.11.3 Prison Service;

4.1.4.11.4 Wildlife Service;

4.1.4.11.5 Civil Defense Service [Fire Brigade]; and

4.1.4.11.6 National Security Service.

4.1.5 There shall be established a force to be known as VIP Protection Units whose functions and duties shall be determined by law.

#### 4.2 Joint Defense and Security Board (JDSB)

4.2.1 The Joint Defense Board (JDB) shall be renamed as the Joint Defense and Security Board (JDSB) and shall be reconstituted at the level of Chiefs of Defense Forces/Staff, Inspector General of Police and Directors General of National Security Service and all other organized forces to exercise command and control over all forces during the Transitional Period.

4.2.2 The functions of the JDSB shall be to:

4.2.2.1 Recommend to Commanders in Chief, the reconstitution of Joint Military Ceasefire Commission (JMCC) and Joint

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaani Consensus

4.2.2.2

4.2.2.3

4.2.2.4

4.2.2.5

Transitional Security Committee (JTSC) to include representatives of the Armed Opposition Groups;

4.2.2.2 Restructure and unify the army and other organized forces in accordance with the provisions of R-ARCSS and the Tumaani Consensus;

4.2.2.3 Fast-track general and simultaneous disarmament across the country and destroy the arms collected from the civilians and ensure provision of the state security for all the people in South Sudan;

4.2.2.4 Take measures to strengthen the accountability and discipline in the Security Sector; and

4.2.2.5 Ensure deployment of Armed Forces across the Country, including at the Borders, to maintain territorial integrity of the Republic of South Sudan.

#### 4.3 Further Commitments by Parties and Stakeholders on Security Sector Reforms

4.3.1 Development and implementation of a transformational policy framework to govern the security sector institutions on matters including language, recruitment, retirement and oversight, reorganize and professionalize the security sector;

4.3.2 Incorporation of a general amnesty for persons who rebelled against the Government into the final outcome of the Tumaani Initiative as an avenue for fostering peace and reconciliation;

4.3.3 Taking measures to strengthen the accountability and discipline mechanisms in the Security Sector; and

4.3.4 Taking measures including legislative reforms, to address inter-communal violence, child abduction, movement of cattle, cattle-raiding/ rustling in South Sudan.

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaani Consensus

4.3.4

4.3.4

4.3.4

4.3.4

## 5. Protocol on Communal Conflicts, Armed Civilians, and Land Disputes

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders recognize the importance of advancing sustainable peace, security and stability at local levels, acknowledge the intricate connection between national and local conflicts and insecurity, particularly the prevalence of cattle rustling, child abduction, revenge killings, land-related disputes, climate change-induced conflicts and inter-communal violence, and the prevailing inadequate justice and accountability mechanisms.

The Parties and the Stakeholders agree that the Government, through public participation, shall:

5.1 Identify the root causes of communal conflicts and violence and land disputes and provide solutions so as to contribute to overall peace and stability in South Sudan;

5.2 Conduct a comprehensive inquiry into land- and natural resources-related conflicts and climate change-induced disputes across South Sudan and make recommendations, including policy and legal actions required to address these disputes effectively;

5.3 Formulate policies, laws, and establish institutions for addressing root causes of conflict, communal violence, armed civilian groups, and land disputes, thereby contributing to overall peace and stability in South Sudan;

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaani Consensus

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5.4 Enhance coordination and implementation of community dispute resolution mechanisms for addressing land issues, local conflicts, peacebuilding, reconciliation, social cohesion and integration whose functions and composition shall be determined by law;

5.5 Undertake research and analysis on social cohesion, values, peacebuilding and conflict management, and make recommendations to the relevant Government agencies;

5.6 Foster partnerships with the relevant state actors, non-state actors, bi-lateral and multi-lateral agencies on peacebuilding and conflict management;

5.7 Establish early warning and response systems for conflicts and put in place an emergency preparedness and response systems to curb imminent conflicts;

5.8 Promote peaceful co-existence, tolerance, respect and acceptance of diversity in all aspects of life, and encourage appreciation by all ethnic and religious communities for the social, economic, cultural, spiritual and political life of all communities;

5.9 Formulate and implement strategies, plans, educational and training programs to create public awareness and support on the importance of social cohesion, integration, peacebuilding and reconciliation;

Protocols for Initiating - Tumaani Consensus

5.9

5.9

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- 5.10 Facilitate nationwide consultations on the management of small arms and light weapons in the hands of civilians, in order to disarm them in accordance with the law and human rights principles; and

- 5.11 Establish a mechanism for the operationalization of this protocol.



*Protocol for Implementing the Tumaini Consensus*

PER  
P.J.  
N.B.  
G.L.D.  
Mand  
P.A.G.

## 6. Guarantors

THAT the Parties and Stakeholders shall establish internal and external processes and structures that will have a permanent and consistent role in guaranteeing and taking lead responsibility in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus as provided.

The Parties and Stakeholders have resolved to commit to the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus with both internal and external guarantors as detailed below:

### 6.1 Internal Guarantors

- 6.1.1 The Parties and Stakeholders shall establish the National Leadership Council (NLC) that shall be the national / internal guarantor of implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.1.2 The main roles and responsibilities of the NLC shall be to:

- 6.1.2.1 Provide political stewardship and oversight in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.1.2.2 Provide strategic leadership and guidance to the Security Sector Reform / Oversight Commission, the Governance Oversight Commission, and other public agencies whose mandate is relevant to the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.1.2.3 Preside over and resolve disputes and conflicts in matters

*Protocol for Implementing the Tumaini Consensus*

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Mand  
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related to the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.1.2.4 Receive reports from all mechanisms established under the R-ARCSS as amended and the Tumaini Consensus; and

- 6.1.2.5 Coordinate with Tumaini Initiative on implementation of the key elements of this framework and on meeting of the deadlines of scheduled actions.

- 6.1.3 The NLC shall have a Chairperson, in the absence of whom, the Deputy Chairperson shall act;

- 6.1.4 The NLC shall hold regular meetings to deliberate and make decisions, including seeking political consensus, regarding the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.1.5 The NLC, in coordination with Tumaini Initiative, shall establish measures and systems to carefully track the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus;

- 6.1.6 Decision-making in the NLC shall be by consensus and, in lieu of that, by two thirds (2/3<sup>rd</sup>) majority;

- 6.1.7 The decisions of the NLC shall be final and not subject to approval by the Cabinet or Legislature;

- 6.1.8 The NLC shall establish a National Implementation and Oversight Committee (NIOC) composed of members seconded by each party represented at the NLC, nominees of Civil Society Organisations, Faith-Based groups, other Stakeholders, Donors and Partners, and whose mandate shall be to:

*Protocol for Implementing the Tumaini Consensus*

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Mand  
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- 6.1.8.1 Act as secretariat of the NLC and, in coordination with Tumaini Initiative, provide technical and administrative support to the NLC to enable the Council to carry-out its functions and duties;

- 6.1.8.2 Manage the day-to-day coordination of activities in the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus; and

- 6.1.8.3 Establish a system to track the implementation of the Tumaini Consensus in coordination with Tumaini Initiative.

- 6.1.9 The NIOC shall have a Head of the Secretariat and a Deputy, whom shall be appointed by the NLC;

- 6.1.10 The NIOC shall establish its structures and transparently and competitively recruit staff to carry out its day to day activities;

- 6.1.11 The NIOC shall be funded by the Government, the Tumaini Initiative and Donors;

- 6.1.12 Funds received for the NIOC shall be deposited into the account of the NIOC and shall be jointly managed by the Head of the Secretariat, Representatives of the Tumaini Initiative and Donors/Partners, who shall be the signatories to the Account;

- 6.1.13 All public institutions and agencies of Government, civil society and faith-based organisations, and other stakeholders shall provide the necessary assistance and

*Protocol for Implementing the Tumaini Consensus*

PER  
P.J.  
N.B.  
G.L.D.  
Mand  
P.A.G.

## Annex 27: Withdrawal of SPLM-IO from Tumaini Initiative



### SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT (IO) GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

#### RESOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SPLM/SPLA (IO) FROM THE TUMAINI INITIATIVE

The SPLM/SPLA (IO) Political Bureau met on July 16, 2024 to deliberate on the Protocols of "Tumaini Consensus for Sustainable Peace in South Sudan" that were initialed by the Parties and Stakeholders to the Tumaini Initiative.

The initialed Protocols establish alternative institutions, replacing or running in parallel with those in R-ARCSS besides repeating most provisions in R-ARCSS or existing national laws. The Protocols clearly breach the R-ARCSS and undermine the ongoing peace implementation processes.

The Tumaini Initiative was supposedly a mediation forum. However, in the initialed Protocols, this is not the case. The Initiative has arrogated to itself many roles including being a funder, a supervisor, a coordinator, a convener of a donor conference, a fund manager, a monitor of the implementation, a guarantor and a governing authority. Therefore, the "Tumaini Initiative" undermines the sovereignty of the Republic of South Sudan.

The proposed Security Sector Reforms/Oversight Commission takes over functions of the following existing mechanisms and institutions of R-ARCSS:

1. Security Supervision Mechanism (SSM), head and deputy appointed by IGAD.
2. Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), head and deputy appointed by IGAD.
3. Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), head and deputy appointed by IGAD.
4. Strategic Defense and Security Review Board (SDSRB), co-chaired by the Parties to the R-ARCSS and
5. National Transitional Committee (NTC).

The proposed National Leadership Council (NLC) whose decisions "shall be final and not subject to approval by the Cabinet or Legislature" usurps the powers of:

1. The Presidency.
2. The Council of Ministers.
3. The National Legislature and
4. The National Security Council.

The roles of the guarantors namely; IGAD, AU, CS, UN, EU, Troika, and IGAD Partners Forum, who are seized of the peace process in South Sudan, are muted.

*RMTD*





Page 1 of 2

In light of the above development, the SPLM/SPLA (IO) rejects the initialed Protocols and declares its withdrawal from the Tumaini Initiative as it has deviated from the intended purpose of being an Annex to R-ARCSS and not a stand-alone Agreement.

In conclusion, we would like reiterate our unwavering commitment to inclusive peace and implementation of the R-ARCSS as the only viable framework for attaining sustainable peace and stability in South Sudan.

Sign:

  
Riek Machar Teny-Dhurgon,   
Chairman and Commander-in-Chief of SPLM/SPLA (IO), and  
First Vice President of the Republic of South Sudan,  
Juba  
16 July 2024



## Annex 28: UPDF in Kajo Keji, Central Equatoria State

### 1.Excerpts of a video of the detention of South Sudanese men by armed UPDF soldiers in August 2024 in Kajo Keji.

Note: the UPDF soldiers' patches are visible. An SSPDF soldier can be heard in the background reporting the event over the phone to his superior.





**2. Mediation meeting in the presence of the Kajo Keiji county commissioner, David Lisi Christopher, UPDF, Ugandan police and SSPDF officers on 6 September 2024 in Kajo Keiji county in South Sudan.**



## Annex 29: Statement by Kajo Keji County Commissioner, 29 August 2024



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE  
KAJOKEJI COUNTY



OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER

Ref: KKC/CES/59/A07/2024

TO MJ. GENERAL KULANG MAYEN  
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SSPDF REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
29/8/2024

**AREAS OF KAJO KEJI COUNTY CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN ENCROCHED (GRAPPED) BY UGANDA**

Kajo-Keji is a county in central Equatoria state republic of south Sudan that borders the neighboring Uganda in the districts of moyo, and yumbe.

These districts of Uganda had been engaged in encroachment of land of Kajo-Keji and causing insecurity within the border communities.

Find below the areas graphed and re-named by Uganda

S/No	Payam of origin	Name of area taken	New name given by Uganda	Approximate area in kms
1	<b>Liwolo payam</b>	Sokodo/ tirye	Tire village Kerwa SC	25Kms
2		Kaboro village	Kaboro A&B KSC	26kms
3		Kulasar village	Kulasar village KSC	25 kms
4		Mijale village	Mijale, kerwa sub county	20kms
5		Pingo village	Pingp Kerwa sub county	22kms
6		Rodo village	Rodo kerwa sub county	20kms
7		Merewa village	Merwa KSC	30akm
8		Gorbeleng village	Gorbeleng KSC	30km
9		Mokaden village	Mokaden v11	20kms
10		Guruwa village	Woroworo village	28kms
11		Kolorunga village	Kulurung village	20kms
12		Mapu village	Mapu village KSC	20kms
13		Kopionga village	Kapionga parish KSC	22kms
14		Kolorok village	Uturuko village	22kms
15		Erepunga village	Erepunga KSC	21kms
16		Limu village	Limu parish	21kms
17		Kogwo village	Kogwo village KSC	20kms
18		Longolijo village	Longolijo village KSC	21dkms
19		Wangor village	Wangor village KSC	17kms
20		Alidoro village	Alidoro KSC	15kms
21		Tigawate village	Central mijale village	20kms
22		Matkulu village	Markulu KSC	20kms
23		Aludu village	Centre liku village	15kms
24		Buyi village	Uluga village	20kms
25		Kobe village	Usubira village	15kms
26		Gwuto ko tokoyot	Ura village	22kms

		village		
27		Lema village	Lema KSC	24kms
28		Kukuduk village	Kukuduk KSC	4kms
29		Koburuwa village	Koburuwa KSC	23kms
30		Kilaji village	Kilaji KSC	21kms
31		Kupiya village	Loguteleng village	21kms
32		Sisi village	Sisi KSC	20kms
33		Loduwa village	Midigo Sub county	3kms
34		Dukulya village	Ubetiku village midigo	4kms
35		Biyabe village	Gumbiri village	16kms
36		Lobe village	wombe village	5kms
37		Morsak village	Achilaya villageg	4kms
38		Muluwe village	Sere village	5kms
39		Gwongatulu village	Gwongatulu KSC	23kms
50		Letimekor village	Letimekor KSC	23kms
51		Baranya kuto village	Baranyakuto KSC	22kms
52		Kambala village	Ambala village	24kms
<b>Kangapo 2 payam</b>				
1		Gwere village	Gwere sub county	25kms
2		Masaka village	Masaka GSC	25kms
3		Murerya village	Murerya GSC]	25kms
4		Lunyamiro village	Linyamiro GSC	10kms
5		Morod village	Morodo GSC	15kms
6		Lojili village	Lojili village GSC	12kms
7		Manse village	Manse GSC	10kms
8		Worilowoga village	Worilowoga GSC	8kms
9		Tiwoyo Village	Tiwoyo village GSC	7kms
10		Lere village	Lere village GSC	8kms
11		Ebeya village	Ebeya village GSC	13kms
12		Garamba village	Wakale village]	10kms
13		Monikdisi village	Malanga village	18kms
14		Komba village	Mundusaku village	26kms
15		Majaburo village	Elema east	32kms
16		Gorbeleng village	Kamurope villae	30kms
17		Amerok village	Maru village	16kms
18		Ayumani village	Gobor village	35kms
19		Kolipi village	Elema village	17kms
20		Nyaingamuda village	Fitinabaya village	25kms
21		Lepori village	Lefori sub county	19kms
<b>Kangapo 1 payam</b>				
1		Lojore Village	Lojore afoji Sub county	15kms
2		Koru koria	Koruo village ASC	15kms
3		Loruwondi village	Inigo village	18kms
4		Magorlobong village	Magorlobong village	20kms
5		Waalo village	Wano village	18kms
6		Ludara village	Ludara village	13kms
7		Robojo village	Robojo village	12kms
8		Kimu village	Kimu village	9kms
9		Tor-li village	Tor-li village	15kms
10		Danakorwi village	Danakorwi village	10kms
11		Kiyongo village	Edefia village	20kms
12		Koree village	Eriya village	20kms
13		Masalowa village	Macholola village	25kms



REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
CENTRAL EQUATORIA STATE  
KAJOKEJI COUNTY



OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER


14		Yakijimiji village	Abaya village	19kms
15		Gworong lolyong village	Moi anzo village	19kms
16		Apoji village	Afoji village	17kms
17		Fudia village	Fudia village	15kms
18		Onyire village	Onyire village	13kms
19		Gwulukuk village	Gwulukuk village	16kms
20		Minje village	Minje village	17kms
21		Kongolo village	Kongolo village	18kms
22		Pasokwi village	Pasokwi village	16kms
23		Itiya village	Itiya village	17kms
24		Eduwa village	Edua village	20kms
25		Moipileya village	Moipi lea village	15kms
26		Lugwakiya village	Lugwakia village	17kms
27		Aripijo village	Aripijo village	18kms
28		Kerepi village	Kerepi/arepi	20kms
29		metutametun	Metu sub county	25kms
30		Longirakoru	Lepo village	18kms
31		Kuruse village	Wuruse village	15kms
32		Suluwa village	Soloa village	18kms
33		Marindi village	Mulango/ moyo hospital	25kms

These are real fact from the land lords of the three payams.




**David Lisi Christopher**  
County Commissioner Kajo-Keji County  
Central Equatoria State Juba

## Annex 30: SSPDF Press Release concerning meeting with UPDF, 2 October 2024



**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**  
**SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENSE FORCES**  
**DIRECTORATE OF MEDIA AND PRESS**



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**OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON**


Your Ref: ..... Date: .....

Our Ref: .....


**Press Release on the meeting between SSPDF and UPDF Chiefs of Defence Forces**

On September 28<sup>th</sup>, 2024, SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces travelled to meet with his Ugandan counterpart. The two army chiefs met, held and concluded a very successful meeting. They agreed on immediate implementation of the following points:

1. UPDF stops further encroachment into South Sudan territories. This pause is aimed at giving time to the two governments to find lasting solutions to the recurrent border issues (in other words, allow the High-Levelled Technical Committee, to continue deliberations on Border delimitations and demarcations)
2. Observe & maintain a cordial and harmonious working relationship along the common border.
4. Trade and commerce to continue.
5. SSPDF to deploy additional forces along Juba-Nimule Road to ensure and enhance safety of public road users.
6. SSPDF army chief secured the release of three own servicemen that were arrested and detained by UPDF in July 2024. The army chief had also technically succeeded in securing release of Capt. Machol Majur Madol, from South Sudan National Police Service, Department of Traffic Police, who was arrested in July 2024 by Uganda Revenue Authorities while in possession of a fully loaded pistol.

Signed 

**Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang PSC(ET)**  
 Director for Media & Press and SSPDF Spokesperson,  
 SSPDF GHQs-Bilpam



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TEL: +211 922 282 534, +211 914 917 786  
 Email: lul\_orcd@hotmail.com

## Annex 31: UPDF Press Statement concerning meeting with SSPDF, 28 September 2024



**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE & VETERAN AFFAIRS**  
**UGANDA PEOPLES' DEFENCE FORCES**  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE PUBLIC INFORMATION  
MoDVA Headquarters



Our Ref: UPDF/DDPI/83A  
Your Ref: .....

28 September 2024

### **PRESS STATEMENT**

#### **BILATERAL RELATIONS**

Gen Kainerugaba Discusses Security Cooperation with his South Sudan Counterpart.

The Chief of Defence Forces and Senior Presidential Adviser for Special Operations, Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba this afternoon held talks with his South Sudan counterpart Gen Santino Deng Wol.

The meeting at the Defence Intelligence and Security Headquarters focused on regional security issues of mutual interest.


The two military leaders acknowledged the longstanding relationship between Uganda and South Sudan, committing to further enhancing military to military relations, that are equally historic.

The meeting was attended by several UPDF leaders including the deputy CDF Lt Gen Sam Okiding, Airforce Commander Lt Gen Charles Okidi, the Deputy Commander Land Forces Maj Gen Francis Takirwa and the Chief of Defence Intelligence and Security Maj Gen James Birungi.

The meeting was also attended by Chiefs of Staff of Services, the 4Division Commander Brig Felix Busizoori and the 5Division Commander Brig Keith Katungyi among others.

The South Sudan chief was also accompanied by senior military officials from his country.

Since assuming office of the CDF, Gen Kainerugaba has met with his counterparts from several countries including Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, highlighting his resolve to enhance security cooperation with regional militaries and others that may not directly share a common border with Uganda, for Peace and Stability of the African People.




DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC  
INFORMATION  
FELIX M. KULAYIGYE psc (K)  
Brigadier General  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
VETERAN AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC INFORMATION

## Annex 32: Pictures of meeting between UPDF and Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004)

On 28 September 2024, Santino Deng Wol (SSi.004), the SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces, travelled to Uganda in violation of the travel ban, one of the restrictive measures established by Security Council Resolution 2206 (2015), most recently extended by resolution 2731 (2024).


The meeting was confirmed by a UPDF press release, issued on 28 September 2024. It is available from: [https://x.com/MODVA\\_UPDF/status/1840043839676965095](https://x.com/MODVA_UPDF/status/1840043839676965095)





The South Sudan chief was also accompanied by senior military officials from his country.

Since assuming office of the CDF, Gen Kainerugaba has met with his counterparts from several countries including Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, highlighting his resolve to enhance security cooperation with regional militaries and others that may not directly share a common border with Uganda, for Peace and Stability of the African People.



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FELIX M. KULAYIGYE psc (K)  
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
Brigadier General  
VETERAN AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR DEFENCE PUBLIC INFORMATION

Additional photographs are also available, depicting the two military leaders meeting at the UPDF Defence Intelligence and Security Headquarters. See for example:

Sudan Tribune, Ugandan army chief meets South Sudanese counterpart in Kampala, 28 September 2024:


<https://sudantribune.com/article291467/> see also a video of the event, available from:

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3quUP4eZBac>







## Annex 33: Partial flight-data for flights between Uganda and South Sudan



## Annex 34: SSPDF statement refuting a “vehicles supply deal,” 19 August 2024



**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**  
**SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S DEFENSE FORCES**  
**DIRECTORATE OF MEDIA AND PRESS**



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**OFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON**

August 19<sup>th</sup>, 2024

**SSPDF Refutes Vehicles Supply Deal**

The Office of SSPDF would like to unequivocally deny claims by Dynamic Defence Solutions that it had reached an agreement to supply vehicles to the national army.

To the contrary, on August 12<sup>th</sup>, 2024, some representatives from aforementioned company, accompanied by Assistant Chief of Defence Forces for Logistics and Director for Transport and Maintenance paid a courtesy visit to the Director General for Procurement.

The officials, only used opportunity availed to them to market company's areas of specialty and capabilities. In the light of above, SSPDF command/leadership would like to conclude by underscoring the following:


1. No Memorandum of Understanding was signed between SSPDF and Dynamic Defence Solutions;
2. No contract was offered to Dynamic Defence Solutions to supply vehicles to SSPDF;
3. Purchase of classified/strategic equipment is beyond the jurisdiction of SSPDF and the Directorate of Procurement;
4. SSPDF is still under arms embargo hence has no legal basis and authority to engage in defence contracts and
5. Finally, SSPDF takes this opportunity to officially distance itself and brush aside claims by Dynamic Defence Solutions that it was contracted to supply vehicles.

Signed.....

**Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang PSC (ET)**

Director for Media & Press and SSPDF Spokesperson,

SSPDF GHQs-Bilpam



**SOUTH SUDAN PEOPLE'S  
DEFENCE FORCES**

13 AUG 2024

**SSPDF SPOKESPERSON**

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 Email: lul\_orcd@hotmail.com

**Annex 35: Final list of military items requested by Peter Biar Ajak**Source: US District court for the district of Arizona<sup>133</sup>

<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Unit Price</u>	<u>Total</u>
1. AK-47 Rifles (Full Auto)	1,000	\$350.00	\$350,000.00
2. PKM Rifles	300	\$675.00	\$202,500.00
3. RPG-7 launcher	200	\$575.00	\$115,000.00
4. 7.62x39 ammo	2,000,000	\$.17	\$340,000.00
5. 7.62x54 ammo	1,500,000	\$.21	\$315,000.00
6. PG-7 HE round	1000	\$600.00	\$600,000.00
7. PSL Sniper Rifle	70	\$1092.50	\$76,475.00
8. FIM92 Stinger System	10	\$80,000.00	\$800,000.00
9. Satellite phone	20	\$1,200.00	\$24,000.00
10. Handheld Radio	50	\$500.00	\$25,000.00
11. M67 Hand Grenades	500	\$60.00	\$30,000.00
12. PG-7VT/PG-7T AT Round	500	\$800.00	\$400,000.00
13. AN/PVS Monocular	10	\$12,000.00	\$120,000.00
		Subtotal-	\$3,397,975.00
		Transportation-	<u>\$575,000.00</u>
		<b>Total -</b>	<b>\$3,972,975.00</b>

<sup>133</sup> See [https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/filings/DLKQXQ4Y/USA\\_v\\_Keech\\_et\\_al\\_\\_azdce-24-00394\\_\\_0022.0.pdf](https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/filings/DLKQXQ4Y/USA_v_Keech_et_al__azdce-24-00394__0022.0.pdf).

**Annex 36: Allocation of Nile blend cargos, May and September 2024**

  
**REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN**  
**MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM**

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REF: RSS/MOP/J/O/U/5/24/120 17th May, 2024

[REDACTED]  
Hai Matar  
Juba South Sudan

**RE: NOMINATION LETTER FOR ALLOCATION IN JULY, 2024**

Reference to the above and the letter of the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MOFP) Ref: RSS/MOFP/J/1STUSF14/5/24-1, regarding advance payment on the Cargo.


The Ministry of Petroleum, Republic of South Sudan is pleased to allocate one cargo (600,000 BBL) of Nile Blend loading July 2024, to [REDACTED] LTD.


Final award letter will later indicate the discount/Premium and the lifting window.

[REDACTED] is expected to advance forty million (40m) United States Dollars, after receiving this award letter.

Please accept the assurance of my highest regards and consideration.

Regards,

  
Dr. William Anyak Deng  
Undersecretary



The Undersecretary

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PO Box 376, Opp. Presidential Palace (J1), Juba - South Sudan  
General Line : +211 915 177 770 | E-mail : undersecretary@mop.gov.ss | www.mop.gov.ss

# Republic of South Sudan (RSS)



## MINISTRY OF FINANCE & PLANNING (MoFP) 1<sup>st</sup> Undersecretary of Finance

REF:RSS/MoFP/J/1<sup>st</sup>USF/27/08/2024/05

September 10, 2024

Hon. Dr. Chol Deng Thon Abel  
Undersecretary,  
Ministry of Petroleum

Dear Hon. Undersecretary,

**RE: Allocation of One (1) Crude Oil Cargo for the Month of April, 2025 to** [REDACTED]

Greetings and best wishes from the Ministry of Finance and Planning. Reference is made to the aforementioned subject. I am writing to respectfully request your office to purpose allocation of **One (1) Crude Oil Cargo** for the month of **April, 2025** to [REDACTED] as directed by the Minister of Finance and Planning.

Let me avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Hon. Garang Majak Bol  
1<sup>st</sup> Undersecretary  
Ministry of Finance and Planning



***Copy Furnished:***

- Hon. Minister of Finance and Planning
- File





REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN  
MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM

RSS/MOP/J/O/U/9/24/061

19<sup>th</sup> September 2024


**RE: REVOCATION OF ALLOCATION OF ONE CARGO OF NILE BLEND FOR THE  
MONTH OF APRIL 2025 TO [REDACTED]**

Reference is made to the above-mentioned subject and the letter of the 1<sup>st</sup> Undersecretary of Ministry of Finance and Planning dated 10<sup>th</sup> September 2024 with Ref: No. **RSS/MOFP/J/I<sup>st</sup>USE/27/8/24/05** to Ministry of Petroleum (MoP) pertaining to the allocation of one (1) Cargo of Nile Blend for the Month of April 2025 to [REDACTED]

Ministry of Petroleum, Republic of South Sudan, scrutinizes and ultimately registers potential oil lifting companies through a set of technical requirements, including, but not limited to, checking their presence in both regional and international oil lifting markets, submission of financial statements, approval by the Bank of South Sudan (BSS). [REDACTED] is not registered as one of the oil marketing companies.

Premised on the foregoing, MoP is hereby informing your revered office about the revocation of allocation of one (1) cargo of Nile Blend equivalent to 600,000 bbl due to lack of registration and conflicting schedules.

Please, accept the assurance of my highest regards and consideration.

  
**Dr. Chol Deng Thon Abel**  
Undersecretary  
Ministry of Petroleum



Cc: 1<sup>st</sup> Undersecretary, Ministry of Finance and Planning

Cc: File

**The Undersecretary**

PO Box 376, Opp. Presidential Palace (J1), Juba- South Sudan  
General Line: +211 915177770 | Email: [undersecretary@mop.gov.ss](mailto:undersecretary@mop.gov.ss) | [www.mop.gov.ss](http://www.mop.gov.ss)

## Annex 37: Legal framework for oil-related payments and transparency

### Extracts from the 2012 Petroleum Revenue Management Act

- Councils.
- CHAPTER IX**  
**TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY**
- 30. Transparency as a Fundamental Principle**
- (1) The management of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, and any related duty of any relevant party, shall be carried out in an open and transparent manner.
  - (2) In the exercise of their functions and competencies, and as provided for in this Bill, the National Legislature, Ministry, Bank of South Sudan and Investment Advisory Committee shall take all necessary measures to ensure free access to public information.
  - (3) Access to public information shall be in accordance with the Right to Information Act 2013.
- 31. Declaration of Confidentiality**
- (1) Information or data may be declared confidential and not to be disclosed to the public if such information:
    - (a) significantly prejudices the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds;
    - (b) jeopardizes the independence of the Investment Advisory Committee, any of its members, or both;
    - (c) prejudices the freedom of discussion within or among the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan, or the Investment Advisory Committee; or
    - (d) may lead to unfair competition, improper gains or advantage for a third party or unfair disadvantage for the parties involved.
  - (2) The declaration of confidentiality shall be made by the Ministry, Bank of South

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- Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee and shall provide:
- (a) a justification based on one or more grounds detailed in subsection (1) of this Section; and
  - (b) the period in which such information shall be declared confidential.
- (3) Without prejudice to subsection (1) of this Section, and unless the parties agree to disclose such communication, internal communications within the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee shall be kept confidential.
  - (4) Any party affected by the disclosure of information on grounds detailed in subsection (1)(d) of this Section may request a declaration of confidentiality of such information to the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee.
  - (5) The Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan or the Investment Advisory Committee shall issue a decision on the request for declaration of confidentiality under subsection (4) of this Section.
  - (6) In case of denial, the interested party may appeal to the Competent Court within fifteen days from the date in which the decision under subsection (5) of this Section was communicated to him or her.
  - (7) The Minister shall issue regulations on further detail procedures under subsections (4), (5), and (6) of this Section.
  - (8) The justification on the confidentiality of information shall be made available to the public upon request.
  - (9) Upon expiration of the period referred to in paragraph (2) (b) of this Section, and if any grounds on which the declaration of confidentiality was based no longer exists, information shall be disclosed to the public.

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- not financial assets of government and the rate of savings; and
- (f) a list of names of persons holding positions relevant for the operation and performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, including:
- (i) the Minister;
  - (ii) the director general of accounts of the Ministry;
  - (iii) the chairpersons, deputy chairpersons and members of the Investment Advisory Committee;
  - (iv) the Governor;
  - (v) the external investment manager(s), if any; and
  - (vi) the designated signatories that are authorized to request transfers from the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds.

- (3) The sources of the information described in subsection (2) of this Section, in whatever form, including the reports and statements, shall be annexed to the annual report in unedited form.
- (4) The annual report shall be published by the Ministry within fifteen days of its submission to the National Legislature.

#### 15. Annual Disclosure and Publication of Payments

- (1) Licensees, contractors and sub-contractors shall annually disclose information on all payments, monetary or in kind, made to Government agencies in connection with Petroleum Activities. The Government shall disclose the revenue received in connection with Petroleum Activities without regard to any provisions of confidentiality.
- (2) Any disclosure under this Section shall be reported to an independent entity, selected and appointed for this purpose, and the information shall be published and verified in accordance with the principles of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative as prescribed in the regulations.
- (3) Confidentiality sections or other sections in a Petroleum Agreement that prevent

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disclosure of information on any payments made and revenues received in connection with Petroleum Activities conducted in South Sudan shall be void to the extent required for disclosure of such information as set out in subsection (1) of this Section.

- (4) The Ministry shall issue regulations respecting all matters relating to disclosure and publication of information under this Section, including orders to administrative agencies requiring them to provide information relating to payments and revenues.

#### 36. Publication of Information

- (1) The Ministry shall ensure that this Bill and any of its regulations, the Investment Policy, the Investment Guidelines, the operational management agreements provided in Section 8 and 16(7) of this Bill, and the rules and procedures of the Investment Advisory Committee provided in Section 21(6) of this Bill, are readily available to the public not later than thirty days after their respective enactment or adoption.
- (2) Appointment of the Investment Advisory Committee shall be published in the Official Gazette.
- (3) Information required to be made public under this Chapter shall also be published online on the website of the Ministry, the Bank of South Sudan and the National Legislature.
- (4) The Ministry shall also make copies of the information available at its headquarters.

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## 32. Records of Petroleum Revenue

- (1) The Ministry shall publish the records of Petroleum Revenue in accordance with Section 6 of this Bill no more than six weeks after the end of each Quarter.
- (2) The records of Petroleum Revenue published under subsection (1) of this Section shall be disaggregated by type of revenue and individual transaction.
- (3) In addition to the records of Petroleum Revenue, the information shall include transfers from the Petroleum Revenue Account to the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds and the Consolidated Fund, transfers from the Consolidated Fund to the Petroleum Producing States and Local Communities, and the balance of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds.
- (4) The information shall be published simultaneously in the official gazette, the Ministry's website and in at least two national daily newspapers and duly communicated to the National Legislature.

## 33. Quarterly Reports

- (1) The Bank of South Sudan shall present to the Minister and the Investment Advisory Committee quarterly reports on the in- and outflow and the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds during the Quarter and the value of the assets and where the assets are held at the end of the Quarter, no later than by the end of the ensuing month.
- (2) The Bank of South Sudan shall make the quarterly reports publicly available no later than six weeks after the end of the Quarter.
- (3) The Bank of South Sudan shall ensure that in releasing, or allowing access to, such reports, measures are taken to prevent the disclosure of confidential information.

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## 34. Annual Reports

- (1) The Minister shall submit an annual report for the Petroleum Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds to the National Legislature no later than four months after the end of the Financial Year.
- (2) The annual report shall be prepared in such manner that makes it readily adaptable for dissemination to the public and shall contain the following information for the Financial Year for which the report is prepared:
  - (a) a report signed by the Minister describing the investment Policy and performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, any advice received from the Investment Advisory Committee, and any other matter related to the management of Petroleum Revenue and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds that may be of concern or interest to the National Legislative Assembly;
  - (b) a report signed by the Investment Advisory Committee describing the investment Guidelines and any changes made during the Financial Year, a comparison of the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds against the established benchmark indices of the investments and against the performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds for the previous three years, and any other matter relevant for the implementation of the investment Policy and performance of the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds, including, but not limited to, an assessment of the internal and external audits and risk management and control systems in place by the Bank of South Sudan;
  - (c) the Auditor General's report, including the audited financial statements with notes of the Petroleum Revenue Account and the Petroleum Revenue Saving Funds and any report from the independent auditor;
  - (d) a list of all payments of Petroleum Revenue made to the Petroleum Producing States and Local Communities, and payments of Petroleum Revenue by the Petroleum Producing States and Local Communities to each applicable Local Government Councils, for the Financial Year;
  - (e) the liabilities of government borrowings in a manner that provides an accurate representation of the past and expected future development of the

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## Annex 38: Budget for the financial year 2024/25

Panel analysis, based on first draft of budget presented to the Revitalized Transitional National Legislative Assembly on 25 September 2024

Official exchange rate SSP/US\$ (Oct 2024)	3,098		
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	SSP	US\$ (est.)	
<b>Projected government revenue</b>			<b>% of total revenue</b>
<b>Projected oil revenues</b>			
DPOC	0	0	
GPOC	943,610,579,883	304,587,017	
SPOC	194,823,738,558	62,886,939	
<b>Total oil revenue</b>	<b>1,138,434,318,441</b>	<b>367,473,957</b>	<b>50.43%</b>
<b>Projected non-oil revenue</b>			
Customs duty	552,284,081,279	178,271,169	
Misc taxes and fees	566,920,329,811	182,995,587	
<b>Total non oil revenue</b>	<b>1,119,204,411,090</b>	<b>361,266,756</b>	<b>49.57%</b>
<b>Total projected government revenue</b>	<b>2,257,638,729,531</b>	<b>728,740,713</b>	


  

<b>Government expenditure</b>			<b>% of total spending</b>
<b>"Mandatory government expenditure"</b>			
Transfers to Sudan for oil pipeline	157,035,230,468	50,689,229	3.76%
Transfers to oil producing states (2%)	22,768,686,369	7,349,479	0.55%
Transfers to oil producing communities (3%)	34,153,029,553	11,024,219	0.82%
Transfers to Ministry of Petroleum (3%)	34,153,029,553	11,024,219	0.82%
Debt repayment	286,642,748,700	92,525,096	6.87%
National Revenue Authority Retention	54,957,368,080	17,739,628	1.32%
Oil for roads	0	0	0.00%
Other capital projects	493,482,795,275	159,290,767	11.83%
<b>Total "mandatory expenditure"</b>	<b>1,083,192,887,998</b>	<b>349,642,637</b>	<b>25.96%</b>
<b>Salary payments</b>			
Salaries	773,759,678,293	249,761,032	18.55%
Salary arrears	642,316,055,668	207,332,491	15.40%
Foreign mission salary arerars	96,003,600,000	30,988,896	2.30%
<b>Total salary expenditure</b>	<b>1,512,079,333,961</b>	<b>488,082,419</b>	<b>36.24%</b>
<b>Other expenditure</b>			
Operating expenditure	413,329,279,511	133,418,102	26.21%
Transfers to States for State budgets	419,306,834,843	135,347,590	26.59%
Peace budget	93,794,227,620	30,275,735	5.95%
Constituency Fund for MPs	30,000,000,000	9,683,667	1.90%
December 2024 Elections	257,521,457,127	83,125,067	16.33%
Humanitarian and emergency fund	173,660,000,000	56,055,520	11.01%
Various other budget lines	189,336,691,868	61,115,782	12.01%
<b>Total other expenditure</b>	<b>1,576,948,490,969</b>	<b>509,021,463</b>	<b>37.80%</b>
<b>Total all government spending</b>	<b>4,172,220,712,928</b>	<b>1,346,746,518</b>	
<b>Deficit</b>	<b>-1,914,581,983,397</b>	<b>-618,005,805</b>	

## Agency spending:

	Salary budget (SSP)	% of total salary budget	Goods and services (SSP)	% of total goods and services	Total budget (SSP)	% of total Ministry spending
<b>Accountability cluster</b>	894,932,810	0.12%	5,848,736,009	1.45%	7,370,156,266	0.39%
<b>Economic Cluster</b>	19,109,574,136	2.47%	49,631,570,445	12.31%	197,443,429,349	10.48%
Of which Ministry of Finance and Planning	1,832,456,166	0.24%	28,331,191,362	7.03%	32,480,160,993	1.72%
<b>Education cluster</b>	84,975,288,417	11.00%	48,077,271,655	11.92%	225,135,744,981	11.95%
<b>Health cluster</b>	5,326,514,447	0.69%	31,156,159,400	7.73%	54,855,922,636	2.91%
<b>Infrastructure cluster</b>	1,595,558,604	0.21%	8,382,367,085	2.08%	13,336,454,811	0.71%
<b>Natural resources cluster</b>	22,406,328,022	2.90%	33,863,145,894	8.40%	351,649,759,145	18.67%
<b>Public administration cluster</b>	75,991,334,896	9.84%	168,546,330,203	41.80%	290,284,083,280	15.41%
Of which Presidential Affairs	2,577,606,960	0.33%	15,594,234,618	3.87%	23,383,834,620	1.24%
Of which Cabinet Affairs	1,465,091,532	0.19%	7,625,921,167	1.89%	16,773,997,323	0.89%
Of which Foreign Affairs	50,377,424,952	6.52%	4,254,097,101	1.05%	55,111,798,592	2.93%
Of which Parliament	10,277,629,488	1.33%	81,444,261,374	20.20%	114,571,166,718	6.08%
Of which Council of States	6,504,809,940	0.84%	25,000,499,165	6.20%	38,371,858,427	2.04%
<b>Security sector</b>	505,880,647,927	65.51%	35,430,397,122	8.79%	599,433,387,770	31.82%
Of which Police	100,406,257,704	13.00%	4,198,497,310	1.04%	158,507,540,170	8.42%
Of which Ministry of Defence	268,614,128,198	34.78%	15,735,791,888	3.90%	288,412,061,028	15.31%
Of which Veterans Affairs	84,588,459,037	10.95%	6,419,463,234	1.59%	91,007,922,271	4.83%
Of which NSS	51,827,888,804	6.71%	6,812,984,565	1.69%	58,737,678,439	3.12%
<b>Rule of law</b>	56,064,967,796	7.26%	22,327,870,875	5.54%	144,039,451,614	7.65%
<b>Totals</b>	<b>772,245,147,055</b>		<b>403,263,848,688</b>		<b>1,883,548,389,852</b>	

## Distribution of salary payments:



Distribution of goods and services spending

